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I. INTRODUCTION
When the members of the Delaware River Basin Commission
(DRBC) met at Dover on March 2, 1967 to adopt a massive pollution
control program for the river, the event had significance not only for
environmentalists, but for every student of American institutions. For
the decision seemed to vindicate the American faith in the power of men
to create both new modes of thought and novel organizational forms
that promise to control the problems of a rapidly changing indus-
trialized society.
On the organizational level, the Basin Commission itself was an
innovative attempt to construct a regional government that proceeded
from the perception that the coherent development of the Delaware
River's resources would be impossible if left to the uncoordinated de-
cisions of each of the four riparian states-New York, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and Delaware-as well as the large number of powerful
federal agencies, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, that had an
interest in the river. To accommodate both state and federal interests,
the Delaware Basin Compact, approved in 1961,1 broke new ground by
providing that the federal government, as well as each riparian state,
would have a voting member on the Commission.' Moreover, unlike so
many earlier interstate compacts, the signatory governments were not
niggardly in granting broad-though not unlimited-powers to the
Commission, which seemed to give the agency a realistic opportunity to
effectuate a comprehensive plan that concerned itself with water quality,
as well as the development of hydroelectric power, recreational areas,
wildlife conservation, flood protection, and water supply.3
The DRBC's pollution control program is significant, however, not
only for what it revealed about the viability of regional government, but
also because it was grounded in a conceptual approach that promised to
enhance dramatically the rationality of decisions affecting environ-
mental quality. An agency embarking upon a water pollution program
must, in one way or another, resolve three basic issues. First, it must
determine the level of water quality that is desired. Secondly, it must
determine the amount of pollutant that must be removed from the stream
in order to achieve the water quality standard selected. Thirdly, the
1 The Compact and formal acts of consent to the Compact by the signatory
governments may be found at: Act of Sept. 27, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat.
688; Dmt-. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6501-13 (Supp. 1970) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:11D-1
through 32:11D-110 (1963), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§32:11D-111 through
32:11D-115 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW §§801-12 (McKinney 1967); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 815.101-815.106 (1967).
2 Delaware River Basin Compact § 2.5.
3id. arts. 4-10; see Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experimnent its Co-
operative Federalism, 63 COLUm. L. Ray. 825 (1963).
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agency must determine the way in which the burden of cleaning up the
river to the desired level will be allocated among the polluters: should
A treat his effluent more than B because it is cheaper for A to do so, or
should a uniform percentage treatment be required of all polluters
regardless of cost, or should each polluter's effluent be of equal purity,
or should some other means of apportioning the burden be selected?
The Commission was not obliged to resolve these issues in a completely
capricious manner, but instead had the benefit of a pioneering study
made by the Department of the Interior, in which an expert staff had
constructed a mathematical model that simulated the impact of pol-
lutants discharged by the industries and cities bordering upon the river.
Using the model, the Interior study attempted to quantify the costs and
benefits of embarking upon a variety of cleanup programs that were
under consideration by the Commission.
This is the first of a series of essays attempting to deal with the
institutional and conceptual novelties involved in the Delaware decision.
In each of the essays, we shall be assuming the perspective of a hypo-
thetical social engineer charged with the task of designing a set of
institutions that promises to handle "best" the complex problems of
environmental regulation posed by a major interstate river. We shall
ask: what does the Delaware's experience teach the Engineer? To re-
spond to this question coherently, it is necessary to attempt a statement
of the basic issues the Engineer may be expected to confront in his
adventure in institution building. Without a notion of the problems
faced by the Engineer, it would be fruitless for us to attempt to act
as interpreters of the Delaware's experience. Thus, while complexities
may be deferred, the nature of the general inquiry will be clarified con-
siderably if from the outset we indicate our understanding of the basic
problem confronting the Engineer, and thereby locate in a larger context
the particular concerns of the present Article.
A. Structuring Decisionmaking on Environmental Questions
The basic problem confronting the institution-builder can best be
understood by contemplating for a moment an extremely simple model
to which a pollution control agency could conceivably conform.
Imagine that, during the course of their deliberations, one of the
Engineer's apprentices suggests that the power to select a pollution
control program for the river be placed in the unchecked discretion of
a single citizen of the Delaware Valley selected by lot. In proffering
the Lottery Model, the Apprentice explains further, he is not suggesting
that it necessarily be adopted: rather, its principal analytical utility lies
in its challenge to his associates to justify their preference for a different
[Vol.120:419
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decisionmaking model, to which the Apprentice would gladly adhere if
he is persuaded that the proposal is superior to the Lottery.
In responding to the Apprentice's challenge, it would appear that
the Engineer and his assistants are faced-at first blush-with an
embarrassment of riches. Not one, but at least four, models may be
plausibly invoked, each offering a different approach to the decision-
making problem. At this early stage in the discussion, it will suffice to
characterize each of the models in highly generalized terms, at the same
time noting the basic grounds upon which the doubting Apprentice may
question their utility to the Engineer in the case at hand.
1. The Political Model
It is not necessary here to explore the Ultima Thule of democratic
political theory to assert that decisions generated by the political
process are generally accorded legitimacy in the contemporary polity.
Moreover, we do not argue here that there is something peculiar to
pollution control policy that renders the complex play of forces set into
motion by the political process an inappropriate mechanism for decision-
making. Rather, the principal difficulty in invoking the Political Model
in the present case lies in the obvious fact that no well developed set of
regional political institutions exists at present that can be expected to
deal coherently with the problems of the Delaware Basin or any other
major interstate river. In addition, embarking upon the difficult task
of constructing a full fledged political system for a river basin would
make sense only if the basin were the geographic locus of a large
number of problems of common concern to the citizens of the basin.
It is not clear that typically this will be the case. Other problems of
greater importance than river development-transportation, housing,
employment, air pollution-may define a more appropriate set of
regional boundaries cutting across watershed lines.4 Organizing re-
gional government by watersheds would, for example, have the un-
fortunate consequence of placing much of New Jersey in one regional
unit, and the City of New York in another. Thus, even if regional
government were a reality, the regions in all likelihood would not be
drawn in a way that would easily solve the Engineer's problem. The
Engineer's principal difficulty, therefore, in designing a set of institu-
tions along the Political Model will simply be: how can decisionmakers
be held politically accountable in the absence of regionally organized
4 For a sensitive introduction to the problem of constituency definition with an
emphasis upon the particular difficulties involved in organizing river basin pollution
control authorities, see Roberts, Organizing Water Pollution Control: The Scope and
Structure of River Basin Authorities, 19 PuBLIc POLICY 75, 83-113 (1971), which
also contains a comprehensive review of previous work in the area.
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political parties, regular elections, interest groups and other sources of
public opinion that discipline and legitimate the politician's attempt to
articulate and effectuate public policy on the local, state, and national
levels? The obvious (perhaps only) response to this question would be
to select the river basin agency's policymakers from local, state, or
national officeholders who have successfully manipulated the political
process at other levels of government. But if this move were taken,
would there be any reason to believe that these politicians, responding to
pressures from their non-regional constituencies, would make the de-
cision that, in any intelligible sense, corresponds to the best interests of
the residents of the river basin? What institutional structures can be
devised that promise to deal with this problem? Without this promise,
is it really quite clear that the Political Model is significantly superior to
the Lottery Model? Thus, the doubting Apprentice.
2. The Technocratic Model
But let us escape from politics. Using contemporary welfare
economics as a conceptual base, professional economists have over the
past generation sought to develop the techniques of cost-benefit analysis
to permit the resolution of complex public policy issues in more familiar
market terms.5  Just as-under perfect competition-the firm that sets
production at the point where its marginal cost is equal to marginal
revenue is acting in the public interest in facilitating the efficient alloca-
tion of resources, so too a pollution control agency should select those
water quality goals at which the marginal cost of abatement equals the
marginal benefit to society. In doing this, the agency will be furthering
the public interest in efficient resource allocation. Thus (says the
Technocrat), if it is possible to quantify accurately the marginal costs
and benefits implied by various levels of water quality, the "marginal
cost = marginal benefit" test permits the resolution of the pollution
problem in the most efficient way without the need to worry overmuch
about the relationship between regional decisionmakers and the political
systems existing upon local, state, and national levels.
5 Water resource development has been one of the principal fields in which leading
economists have attempted to apply "cost-benefit" techniques developed over the past
generation. See, e.g., S. BAIN, R. CAVES & J. MARGOLIS, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA'S
WATER INDUSTRY (1966); R. DORFMAN & H. JACOBY, MODELS FOR MANAGING RE-
GIONAL WATER QUALITY (forthcoming); A. KNEEsE & B. BowER, MANAGING WATER
QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968) ; A. KNEESE & S. SMITH,
WATER RESEARCH (1966); J. KRUTILLA, THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY-ECONOMICS
OF AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT (1967); J. KRUTILLA & 0.
ECKSTEIN, MULTIPLE PURPOSE RIVER DEVELOPMENT (1958); A. MAAss, M. HUF-
SCMIDT, R. DORFMAN, H. THOMAS, S. MARGLIN & G. FARE, DESIGN OF WATER
RESOURCE SYSTEMS (1962).
[Vo1.120:419
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Needless to say, the doubting Apprentice would not be rendered
speechless by the Technocratic argument suggested above: To what
extent can one accurately quantify benefits and costs? What is the rela-
tionship between cost-benefit analysis and the corpus of welfare eco-
nomics that allegedly provides the basis for its claim to legitimacy?
What institutional structures may be devised to induce an agency to
engage in a disciplined analysis of costs and benefits, and to choose the
optimal water quality level in the manner prescribed by the economics
scholar?
3. The Legal-Administrative Model
Advocates of either of the first two models attempt to gain ad-
herence without ascertaining whether the Engineer himself prefers
certain pollution control programs to others. The standard political
theory supporting the Political Model does not seek to justify itself by
arguing that the Model will generate decisions the Engineer personally
considers wise; in order to render a particular pollution decision legiti-
mate, it is enough under the Political Model that the environmental
standard has been set through the democratic process. Similarly, under
the Technocratic Model, it is quite irrelevant whether the Engineer be-
lieves that the Delaware "ought" to be clear as crystal or an open sewer;
it is enough that the Model selects the program cost-benefit analysis
indicates will most efficiently allocate society's finite resources, whatever
concrete substantive outcome is thereby prescribed. It is possible, how-
ever, to embark upon the Engineer's journey in quite a different spirit:
the Engineer could instead choose to immerse himself in the substance
of the particular problem of water pollution control at hand in an effort
to develop a coherent set of policies that, in his best judgment, define
the wisest way to deal with the conflicting interests at issue. If a
preferred set of substantive policies can be established, perhaps the
problem of institution building will be simplified considerably. If, for
example, the Engineer decided that sound social policy required that
the polluted waters of the Delaware be cleansed "to the highest degree
technology permits," 6 it would be a relatively simple matter to design
an institution that would carry the policy out effectively and that would
give concerned groups in the river basin a fair opportunity to explain to
the agency the manner in which the standard should be applied in the
particular river system in question. Indeed, once the standards have
6 See, e.g., the Muslde Bill presently under consideration by the Congress, which
requires all point source polluters to install by 1976 "the best practicable control
technology currently available." S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301(b) (1) (A) (i)
(1971).
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been articulated, it is possible that an administrative agency of the
kind familiar to our post-New Deal polity would prove a satisfactory
institutional vehicle for the Engineer's purposes. Agencies of the kind
enshrined by the federal Administrative Procedure Act are designed in
theory to fulfill the Engineer's basic requirements: an adequate oppor-
tunity is generally provided interested groups to argue the concrete
implications of the general statutory policy; the agency is provided
sufficient expert assistance to evaluate the probable success of alternative
methods of achieving the statutory objective; and, finally, a corps of
legally trained generalists in the judiciary may be relied upon to check
an agency that attempts to embark on a course of action not substan-
tially justified by the statute.7 Doubtless, the federal Administrative
Procedure Act could be improved substantially by an Engineer who
wished to design an institution conforming to the Legal-Administrative
Model; nevertheless, the Engineer would use the A.P.A. as one of the
starting points for his deliberations.
And that is precisely the trouble with the Model in the eyes of the
doubting Apprentice. We have had enough of New Deal failure, he
would suggest. Unless the statute mandates a coherenlt set of relatively
unambiguous policies, there is every reason to believe that history will
repeat itself: the pollution control agency will prove unequal to the task
of developing a coherent set of policies on its own initiative, and will
instead respond principally to the pressures of those polluters who in
theory it is supposed to regulate in the public interest.' Thus, before
considering the important matters of detail involved in the use of the
Legal-Administrative Model, it is critically important to inquire: (a)
whether it is possible to develop one or more approaches to pollution
control policy that will yield a set of standards sufficiently clear and
coherent to serve as an appropriate statutory basis for agency action;
and (b) even if it is possible, whether there is reason to believe that the
legislature would refuse to make the hard choices necessary for a
coherent pollution policy and would instead respond to conflicting
political pressures by enacting a statute framed in purposefully ambig-
uous language, thereby delegating the task of basic policy formulation to
an agency unable to rise to the high challenge of statecraft.
7 See generally, K DA Vs, ADmixisTRATIvE LAW TREATISE (1958, Supp. 1970).
8 For different perspectives on this problem, see H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDEAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS (1962) ;
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1144-1242 (tent. ed. 1958) ; R. NADER, J. EsPosITo & L. SnvER-
MAN, VANISHING AIR (1970); R. NADER & R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE COMMISSION (1970); R. NADER, D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WAST-
LAND (prelim. draft 1971); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent
Regulatory Commissiow, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960) ; Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. CHL L. REv. 47 (1969).
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4. The Common Law Model
What if the defects of each of the previous models prove ir-
remediable? What if we find that no feasible mechanism can be devised
that promises to vindicate the Political Model in a regional context
devoid of developed political institutions; that cost-benefit analysis is
not sufficiently developed to justify the Technocratic Model; that no
statute enacted at present can be expected to incorporate a coherent set
of pollution control policies, as required by the Legal-Administrative
Model? What then is to save us from the Lottery Model? When all
else fails, perhaps it is the judiciary upon whom the Engineer must rely
to serve as the "fourth-best" institutional mechanism for generating
societal pollution policy. In theory, at least, the common-law judge
seems to have a good deal to recommend him: the ideal judge would
strive to be impartial, seek to explicate the complex values of our legal
tradition in an effort to formulate a sensitive response to the novel
aspects of the pollution problem, respond to reasoned arguments ad-
vanced both by the lawyers in the case before him and by academic
critics writing in the law reviews. It is true, of course, that the com-
mon law process will proceed slowly on a case-by-case basis, but in the
absence of a satisfactory alternative, the Common Law Model at least
seems to assure that these incremental decisions will be made in a
conscientious, disinterested, and sensitive fashion.
Let us concede-for purposes of argument-that the judicial
process will in fact substantially conform to the idealized picture sug-
gested by the Common Law Model. Nevertheless, the sceptical Ap-
prentice could still properly doubt the propriety of the Model's claim to
even "fourth-best" status. First, since water quality at any point in
the river is generally a function of the effluent discharged by a consider-
able number of polluters, it will be necessary to embark upon a complex
multiparty litigation our court system handles only with much time
consuming effort. Secondly, rational river planning requires a lengthy
scientific investigation of river conditions that the judge has neither the
expertise, nor the financial resources, to launch. Of course, it would
always be possible for the judge to require either plaintiffs or defendants
to embark upon the elaborate scientific studies necessary for an in-
formed judicial decision. Few private plaintiffs, however, would be
able to afford the millions of dollars and the substantial expenditure of
time that would be required either to initiate an ambitious series of
studies or even to rebut the "expert scientific inquiry" launched by the
defendant polluters.9 Even if the required studies and counterstudies
9 Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in M. BALDwiN &
J. PAGE, LAw A.ND THE ENvioxmE r 105 (1970); Sive, Securing, Examining and
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were proffered, the fact remains that the judge would ultimately be
obliged to evaluate the inevitably conflicting analyses. This is no task
for the typical law-trained professional, who bid a grateful farewell to
integral calculus thirty years previously and who looks at the prospect
of manipulating a computer program with undisguised terror. How
is such a man to decide between the rival scientific analyses proffered by
defendant and plaintiff: by the cut of the expert's jaw? 10 Thirdly,
courts will often select an extremely expensive strategy for achieving
whatever water quality goals they ultimately select. A judge will
typically seek to effectuate his policy by issuing orders to each defendant-
polluter specifying the amount the discharger is to treat its waste. The
fact may be, however, that the cheapest and surest way of attaining the
judicially determined environmental standard will not require that each
discharger treat its own waste on an individual basis but will instead
involve the construction of regional treatment plants and substantial
dams as well as other measures that treat waste after it has been dis-
charged into the stream."' Nevertheless, the judiciary would properly
refuse to adopt any of these strategies requiring courts to assume an
intimate role in the on-going management of the river system. Finally,
assuming these considerable obstacles were somehow overcome, and a
plausible pollution control program were initially articulated, the court
would be incapable of sustaining the scientific inquiry beyond the time
of the original decision so that policies could constantly be modified as
Cross-Examining Expert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, in id. 48. The govern-
ment could bear the litigation expenses either through a subsidy arrangement for
private plaintiffs or by directing state employed attorneys to bring legal action on
behalf of environmental interests. In either case, it would be necessary to develop
guidelines determining the situations in which government resources would appropri-
ately be invested in environmental litigation, and this would raise, in a somewhat
different context, the principal issues canvassed under the Legal-Administrative Model.
If a corps of government lawyers developed substantial sophistication in environ-
mental matters, it is quite possible that courts would begin to give substantial weight
in deciding the merits to the government's decision to bring legal action, thereby
transforming the Common Law Model to one more closely conforming to the Legal-
Administrative Model. Such a phenomenon would parallel developments in the on-
going relationship between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and
the federal judiciary.
10 The judiciary may seek to avoid these difficulties by appointing special masters
with substantial expertise in these matters to evaluate the evidence in the first
instance, thereby transforming the Common Law Model into a kind of Legal-
Administrative proceeding, raising the problems associated with this Model in a
particularly acute form.
11 For example, the problem posed by dissolved oxygen depletion, to be con-
sidered in detail in the body of the text, may sometimes be most efficiently solved
by installing apparatuses in the river itself that introduce dissolved oxygen in those
locations where it is required. See FEDERAL WATER POILUTION CONTROL ADMINis-
TRATIOx, U.S. DE,'T OF INTERIOR, D WAswAR ESTUARY COMPREIENSMIE STUDY:
PREL mINARY REPORT AND FINDINGS 68-69 (1966) [hereinafter cited as DECS] ;
Roberts, supra note 4, at 77. Courts would, however, be severely taxed if they were
required to devise a formula that would assess each polluter's financial contribution
to the fund necessary to purchase and maintain these "in-stream aeration" devices.
[Vo1.120:419
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experience accumulated. It is possible that one of the parties would at
some future point seek to reopen the initial decree or that a new plaintiff
would demand reconsideration of the original judicially imposed pro-
gram. But there is no assurance that the parties would be willing to
make the substantial expenditures necessary for these continual court
tests; there is even less assurance that these episodic court battles would
occur at the points in the river basin's future at which wise planning
would demand that substantial strategy changes be considered. In
short, the judicial process is geared toward the resolution of an isolated
dispute between a small number of parties that can be understood by
the intelligent generalist after a relatively brief study; it is irremediably
distorted when it is called upon to undertake a long-term effort at
reconciling the conflicting claims imposed by a large number of con-
flicting activities upon a natural resource whose character is best under-
stood as a result of an on-going scientific enterprise. 2 Perhaps even
the random decisionmaker selected by the Lottery could design a pol-
lution control system that would take into account the complex nature
of the problem far more satisfactorily than even the most inspired judge
constrained by the Common Law Model, or so the Apprentice would
suggest.
B. Mixed Models and the Delaware Experience
Each of the four Models is, of course, capable of very sustained
elaboration. Doubtless the determined theorist would find that each
of the basic archetypes discussed above embraces a wide variety of sub-
models, differing in important respects from their brothers and cousins
subsumed under the same Model. Equally important, an adequate
theory of social engineering would explore the implications of an almost
infinite variety of mixed models, seeking to remedy the irremediable
defects in one mode of institutional design by complementing it with
features drawn from another archetype. Our crude treatment here is
sufficient for our purposes, however. For we believe that before more
abstract theory can be fruitful, it is necessary to explore concrete cases
with the needs of the theorist in mind. Instead of attempting a more
12As befits an Apprentice, the argument presented in the text is somewhat over-
stated. Courts have engaged in complex on-going enterprises, notably those involving
school desegregation and legislative reapportionment. Similarly, judges have some-
times exercised on-going control of complex business firms undergoing reorganization,
although here the reorganization trustee will generally function as the first-line
decisionmaker, with the judge reviewing the decisions made by others in the manner
contemplated by the Legal-Administrative Model. Even those (like the present
authors) who have generally applauded the judiciary when it has taken an activist,
quasi-managerial role in the vindication of constitutional rights should recognize the
possibility, however, that the managerial role in river basin management could well
be of an order of magnitude too demanding for a lay judge, however conscientious.
430 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:419
reticulated theoretical statement at the outset, we shall move immedi-
ately to consider the manner in which the Delaware's experience en-
lightens certain parts of our primitive conceptual framework.
From this perspective, the importance of our case study centers
around the lessons it can teach about the operation of the Political and
the Technocratic Models of pollution policy formulation in con-
temporary America. As we have already suggested, the voting mem-
bers of the Delaware River Basin Commission are high level political
actors: on matters of primary importance like the question of the water
quality goals to be selected for the polluted sectors of the river, the
Governors of the four riparian states and the Secretary of the Interior
each personally cast equal votes on the Commission, with a simple
majority carrying the day in case of disagreement. Before the
politicians made their final decision, however, one of the most careful
technocratic analyses in the history of American pollution policy had
been attempted, with the aim of clarifying the costs and benefits implied
by selecting each of five different water quality objectives for the river.
Now it happens that the water quality objectives selected by the
Political decisionmakers and the objective suggested by the Techno-
cratic analysis did not coincide: while the Technocrats recommended
a moderately ambitious quality improvement program, the Politicians
selected a much more expensive cleanup goal. Thus, by contrasting the
Technocratic analysis with the dynamics of the Political decision, we
shall gain an insight into the strengths and weaknesses of each of the
two Models. In addition, by considering the way in which Technocrats
and Politicians dealt with the concrete problems of pollution control on
the Delaware, we shall also be gaining an insight into the potential
relevance of the Administrative-Legal Model to the Engineer. For we
shall ultimately argue that along the Delaware (and other rivers) both
Technocrats and Politicians are developing basic pollution policies that
would be rejected by most thoughtful citizens if their premises were
made explicit. Moreover, once the premises of present policy are made
explicit, it may be possible to develop a set of standards sufficiently
explicit to serve as the basis of a Legal-Administrative process that has
some chance of shaping environmental policies more wisely than will
the mixed Political-Technocratic model exemplified by the Delaware's
experience.
But all this is prologue. The present essay does not attempt a
definitive comparison between Political, Technocratic, Legal-Adminis-
trative and Common Law Models, but simply lays a foundation for an
analysis of that ultimate question in a subsequent article. It is our
purpose here to focus attention upon the way in which the "facts"
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about the river's "pollution problem" were presented to the decision-
makers on the Delaware. We have taken this course for three reasons.
First, the way in which the "facts" about the "pollution problem" are
presented has a profound impact upon the kind of policy options de-
cisionmakers will consider seriously. Thus, if the "factual description"
invites decisionmakers to ignore certain dimensions of the "pollution
problem" that seem of great importance, a Model is rendered suspect to
the extent there is reason to believe that the Model's policymakers will
be especially prone to accept the "facts" uncritically. Secondly, since
sound policymaking requires a sophisticated understanding of the factual
context, it is necessary to consider whether any of the Models make
effective fact gathering difficult or impossible. Thirdly, at the end of
this study, the reader will be called upon to understand the nature of
the policy choices open to our society in situations epitomized by the
polluted Delaware. In order to equip him for this task, he must be
furnished with the necessary data.
Given these concerns, three questions seem of fundamental impor-
tance: (a) to what extent does the structure of contemporary scientific
descriptions of the "water pollution problem" invite decisionmakers to
ignore variables that seem important in the satisfactory formulation of
policy; (b) even when considered on its own terms, how reliable is the
information the contemporary factfinder can provide; (c) how can
institutions be structured to facilitate effective factfinding? The im-
portance of the first two questions to our larger goals should be clear:
if the "facts" presented by the "expert" factfinders are unreliable or
ignore crucial dimensions of the "pollution problem," each of the models
must be designed with an eye toward sensitizing decisionmakers to the
inadequacies of the "facts" proffered to him. Similarly, the third ques-
tion raised here, exploring the problem of optimal institutional design
for effective factfinding, has obvious importance to the Engineer choos-
ing between the four models.
II. FRom THEORY TO PRACTICE
It would be a great mistake to assume that a discussion like the
one we have imagined in the Engineer's conference room preceded the
decision to combine elements of the Political and Technocratic Models
in the special mixture they exhibited on the Delaware. Indeed, it is
more truthful to say that nobody ever consciously decided that the
complex decisionmaking mechanism that evolved was the best one for
the job at hand.
For at the very beginning of our story, we encounter a problem
that will complicate it to the end: the fractionation of governmental
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planning and decisionmaking authority made it difficult (if not im-
possible) for any single man or organization to consider the problem
of institutional design from the Engineer's perspective. When the
DRBC became a functioning entity in September of 1961, it found that
a scientific study of the water pollution problem in the Delaware was
already gathering steam under the aegis of the federal Public Health
Service, which subsequently came under the control of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration in the Department of the
Interior. Indeed both the Interior study and the DRBC itself were the
products of the same natural disaster that changed the face of water
policy along the river. In the mid-1950's, the valley had experienced a
series of disastrous floods that had focussed local and state attention
upon the river with an unaccustomed intensity, catalyzing the energies
of a broad range of groups.
The way in which the floods of the 1950's generated political pres-
sures leading to the establishment of the DRBC has been adequately
detailed by others.13 The history of the Department of the Interior's
study, however, is less well known. Within a relatively short time after
the floods, the Army Corps of Engineers was requested by the con-
cerned states to make a comprehensive study of the Delaware watershed.
Given the Corps' own institutional biases, together with the fact that
floods had precipitated its investigation, the Engineers were principally
concerned with devising a plan for building a series of dams for flood
control. The Corps believed, however, that water quality, as well as
water quantity, was within its mandate, and asked the Public Health
Service (PHS) to conduct a study in this area as part of the over-all
effort. Thus, when the Engineers' report was published in the late
1950's it included a chapter containing primitive data on the pollution
problem in the valley.'4
Matters might have been left in this primitive condition but for
developments within the Public Health bureaucracy in Washington.
Cost-benefit analysis was a relatively new idea in Washington during
the waning Eisenhower years and the PHS was eager to apply the new
learning to the solution of water quality problems. Given the fact that
some work had already been undertaken on the Delaware, the river
basin was selected as the testing ground for the new techniques. Thus,
by 1962, the Service's plans had matured to the point where it could
I R. MARTIN, G. BlmKHEAD, 3. BIRxHEAD & F. MUNGER, RIVER BASIN ADMINIS-
TRATION AND THE DEI.AWARE 3-61 (1960); F. ZIMMERMAN & M. WENDELL, New
Horizons on the Delaware, 36 STATE GOVERNMENT 157, 162 (1963).
143 U.S. ARmY ENGINEER DISTRICT, PHILADELPHIA, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REPORT
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE DELAVARE RIVER BASIN: APPENDIX C,
H.R. Doc. No. 522, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-189 (1962) (prepared by the U.S. Dep't
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 1960).
[Vo1.120:419
1972] UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 433
launch its Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey (DECS), which
undertook a pathbreaking scientific analysis of the Delaware's pollution
problem at a cost of $1.2 million over the next four years." During
the earlier years of the study, the DECS proceeded on its way with
very little assistance or guidance from the DRBC, the political agency
with ultimate decisionmaking authority on the matter of pollution in
the Delaware. In part, DECS's independence was explained by the
capriciousness of nature. No longer was the valley victimized by
severe floods; instead, the early and middle 1960's was an era of ever-
deepening drought along the Delaware. As drinking water became
scarce, New York City and Philadelphia became enmeshed in one of
their periodic clashes over their respective rights to tap the Delaware
for water supplies, and the infant DRBC's prime concern was to
mediate the conflict between these cities, as well as among other con-
cerned communities." Water quality seemed of relatively small im-
portance when compared with the consequences of inadequate water
quantity.
The preoccupation of the DRBC was not the only reason for the
independence of DECS. At its inception, the DECS investigators
understood their task principally in academic terms. DECS's research
director, Robert Thomann, was a young sanitary engineer whose
doctoral thesis had proposed a new mathematical model for dealing with
the physical impact of pollutants upon estuaries like the Delaware.'
It was his intention to demonstrate his model's utility in actual
practice, and it was easy to recruit a youthful staff who shared this
exciting goal. The DECS staff, driven by their desire to vindicate the
new scientific methodology, would not have taken kindly to "guidance"
by an agency like the DRBC, which at that time did not contain engi-
neers with similar mathematical competence. Given the DRBC's pre-
occupation with other matters, however, no substantial conflicts along
these lines occurred, and the DECS was permitted to go along its
own way.
All this began to change dramatically with the passage of the
Federal Water Quality Act of 1965,' s which for the first time required
15 Interview with James F. Wright, Executive Director of the Delaware River
Basin Commission, Dec. 1970; Interview with Blair Bower, Resources for the Future,
Nov. 1970; Interview with Walter Lyon, Director of Bureau of Sanitary Engineering,
Department of Environmental Resources, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Aug. 1970;
Interview with Professor Matthew Sobel, Yale Univ., Dec. 1971.
16 R. Hogarty, The Delaware Water Emergency, 1966 (unpublished manuscript,
on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School).
17 R. Thomann, The Use of Systems Analysis to Describe the Time Variation
of Dissolved Oxygen in a Tidal Stream, Feb. 1963 (unpublished thesis in General
University Library, New York University).
18 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §466 (1970)).
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the states to submit water quality standards for federal approval, with
the deadline for submission set for June 30, 1967." Suddenly, the
DECS study was perceived from a more practical perspective. It was
no longer basically a research operation that might inform decision-
makers in the indefinite future. Rather, it became an action-oriented
project promising a suitable basis for establishing regional pollution
control objectives. By this point, however, the DECS staff had de-
veloped enough momentum so that it would have been even more diffi-
cult for the DRBC-still in the midst of the water shortage crisis-to
significantly affect the shape of the DECS study. Thus, it was the
DECS, not the DRBC staff itself, which was principally responsible for
the critical task of framing the alternatives that would be presented to
the political decisionmakers on the DRBC. In response to the 1965
act, the expert Interior staff accelerated the pace of its work, issuing a
"preliminary" report in the middle of 1966, in time for use by the
DRBC in its efforts to develop water quality standards." This is not
to say that the DECS staff framed the alternatives in a vacuum. The
staff perceptively organized a complex set of advisory committees in-
corporating interested industrial, governmental, and citizens groups, so
that important political constituencies would define their own positions
fully armed with the facts as the DECS understood them, and so that
the DECS could incorporate ideas from concerned groups into its
definition of alternative water quality strategies."' Nevertheless, it is
fair to consider the DECS staff itself as the principal entity that
articulated the nature of the basic choices confronting the citizens of
the Delaware Valley.
The core of the DECS preliminary report analyzed the quantifiable
costs and benefits involved in attaining five hypothesized water quality
programs of widely different magnitudes. The least ambitious plan
considered took as its goal the prevention of further degradation in
river quality (Plan V); the most ambitious program contemplated the
greatest possible effort consistent with the limitations of existing tech-
nology (Plan I); Plans II through IV contemplated water quality im-
provements of descending magnitude. When presented in tabular form,
the DECS computer print-out provided information that promised to be
of the highest utility to decisionmakers. Thus, under the regulatory
191d. §5(c) (1), 33 U.S.C. §466(g) (c) (1970).
20 DECS, supra note 11.
21 These committees played an important role in the political process that ulti-
mately defined the river's water quality objectives. Consequently they will be discussed
in more detail in a subsequent essay.
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system the DRBC was most seriously considering,22 the DECS cost-
benefit analyses generated the following figures:
TABLE 123
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF DECS POLLUTION PLANS
High estimate-low estimate
Program Cost of benefits
I $460 million $355-$155 million
II 250 million 320- 135 million
III 120 million 310- 125 million
IV 80 million 280- 115 million
In a sense, all that follows is a commentary upon this table from the
perspectives suggested by the three questions advanced at the end of
our earlier excursion into the theory of Social Engineering. To be
precise, we shall ask:
(1) To what extent did the basic concepts used in the DECS
analysis of the "pollution problem" influence the way in which the
policy options were framed? Did the analysis invite the decisionmaker
to ignore certain fundamental aspects of the problem and emphasize
others unduly? (Section III)
(2) Within its own terms of reference, how reliable was the
information the DECS sought to provide about each of the plans it
presented for the consideration of the political actors on the DRBC?
(Sections IV-VIII)
(3) To what extent did the institutional division between the
DECS, a technocratic arm of the federal government, and the DRBC, a
political body of regional scope, impede or advance the effort to generate
an expert analysis of maximum utility in the decisionmaking process?
(Sections IX-X)
22 As will be described in a subsequent article, this system required different
polluters to treat their wastes in different degrees depending upon the polluter's
geographic location on the river.
23The chart is derived from information to be found in DECS, supra note 11,
at 66, 77. The benefit figures represent the dollar value of the recreational oppor-
tunities generated by improving water quality beyond Program V. In other words,
the value of the existing uses of the water as of 1964 is not included in the statistics
provided by the study. Similarly, the future costs of keeping the river at its present
quality level were estimated by the DECS in a complicated manner, whose nature
will be described in a subsequent article. For present purposes, it will be best to
ignore these complexities by omitting Program V from the cost-benefit chart, as we
have done.
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III. DEFINING THE "POLLUTION PROBLEM"
A layman taking a slow boat trip down the Delaware as it flows
through the densely populated conurbation stretching from Trenton,
New Jersey, through Philadelphia, to Wilmington, Delaware, is offered
an unusual perspective upon contemporary urban industrial civiliza-
tion.24 As he looks up from his boat, he sees enormous factories lined
up one after another belching smoke into the air and dumping stuff of
various kinds into the river; giant tankers and other vessels steam by,
perhaps the ultimate source of the occasional small oil slick that can be
observed; the river is extremely cloudy, with little in the way of aquatic
life visible (although even if the fish were there, it would be difficult to
see them). Despite all this, the number of "pleasure boats" on the
river is surprisingly large, though it is very rare to see a person hardy
enough to dare to swim in what is obviously a "polluted" stream.
There is, doubtless, much in this scene that would disturb a citizen
concerned with the "pollution" problem; there is even more that does
not meet the eye. Indeed, the problem with the "pollution problem" is
that the label subsumes too many discrete issues that must be under-
stood individually before their interrelationships can be mastered in an
intellectual synthesis. And in this perception lies the importance of the
first of the three questions with which this essay is concerned: in its
efforts to "describe the facts" in a systematic way, which aspects of the
"pollution problem" did the DECS staff emphasize and which did they
ignore? To answer this question, we must explore the premises and
character of a mathematical model that was the principal analytical tool
used by the DECS to describe the factual relationships obtaining be-
tween various "pollution sources" and the river's "water quality."
A. Water Quality and Dissolved Oxygen
To write an equation relating "waste" discharges to a river's
"water quality," it is first necessary to define the meaning of "waste"
and "water quality" in terms susceptible of quantification. Since
"waste" may properly be defined as anything that impairs "water
quality," it will be sufficient at the outset to concentrate on defining the
latter term: how, then, are we to measure "water quality"?
DECS answered this threshold question by taking recourse to the
received wisdom of the sanitary engineering profession. Traditionally,
the amount of dissolved oxygen (DO) in the water has served sanitary
engineers as the principal benchmark of water quality, and DECS
adopted this indicator to serve as the focus of its analysis. DO had
24 Both of the authors did in fact take such a journey during the summer of 1970.
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several advantages for the DECS. First, and most important for model
building purposes, DO can be measured. Secondly, the amount of DO
in the stream has an impact upon several important river uses. Fish
need dissolved oxygen to breath. If DO sags below a certain level-at
best ill defined, but between three and four parts per million (ppm) of
water-they will have increasing difficulty breathing. And if oxygen
deficiencies are substantial and sustained, the fish will die.25 If DO
sags yet further to levels approaching zero for substantial periods of
time, a group of microorganisms attack many organic wastes and de-
grade them in a way that throws off offensive odors, notably those
associated with the rotten egg smell of hydrogen sulfide.2" Needless to
say, the presence of these odors makes the river an unpleasant place in
which to boat or swim; nor is picnicking (or even travelling) nearby
an attractive prospect.
Given these facts, it is obviously important to determine the extent
to which the pollutants discharged into a river like the Delaware affect
the stream's DO level, and it is precisely this problem that the DECS
model sought to solve. The pollutants of greatest concern here include
almost all organic compounds like those present in human feces and
many industrial effluents. Perhaps the best way to understand the
essential aspects of the impact of these wastes is to imagine an ex-
periment in which a small lump of sugar is added to a bottle of clean
water. If the amount of oxygen consumed by the microorganisms in
the bottle as they decompose the lump of sugar is measured, a curve
similar to the one in Figure 1 is obtained as time passes.27  In the
shorthand of engineers, the curve depicted in Figure 1 indicates the
Biochemical Oxygen Demand 28 (BOD) exerted by the sugar over time.
25 C. Tarzwell, Water Criteria for Aquatic Life, 1957 (unpublished paper), cited
in T. CAMP, WATER AND ITS IMPURITIES 119 (1963). Camp indicates that:
for a well-rounded warm-water fish population, the dissolved oxygen must not
be below 5 ppm for more than 8 hours of any 24-hour period and at no time
should it be below 3 ppm. For the maintenance of a coarse fish population,
the dissolved oxygen should not be below 5 ppm for more than 8 hours of any
24-hour period and at no time should it be below 2 ppm.
Id. Similar standards may be found in NATIONAL TECHNICAL ADvisoRy COMMITTEE
TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINIS-
TRATION, WATER QUALITY CRITERIA 44 (1968), which suggests that at 3 ppm many
species, especially game fish, suffer a significant retardation of normal growth and
activity. For the approach of the DECS, see Morris & Pence, Quantitative Estimation
of Migratory Fish Survival Under Alternative Water Quality Control Programs
(unpublished manuscript under imprint of Federal Water Pollution Control Admin-
istration, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Edison, N.J.).
26 Hydrogen sulfide is produced by microbial decomposition of organic matter in
the absence of air (anaerobic decomposition). T. CAMP, supra note 25, at 64.
27 This figure is derived from one appearing in id. 246.
28 Id. 243-51. BOD is defined as the number of pounds of oxygen that will be
consumed in the biochemical oxidation of the organic impurity present. Id. 243.
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As the shape of the curve indicates, the more concentrated the pollutant,
the greater the rate at which it is decomposed, 9 and the faster DO is
depleted.
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OXYGEN CONSUMPTION VS. PERIOD OF INCUBATION FOR A CARBONACEOUS MATERIAL
Now suppose that a polluter discharges a lot of waste into a river.
Since the consumption of dissolved oxygen is a function of the concen-
tration of pollutant present, it follows that the concentration of DO will
initially fall off rapidly at the pollutant's point of entry. As time passes,
a given sample of polluted water will move downstream and the con-
centration of pollutant will decrease. As the concentration of pollutant
decreases, DO consumption diminishes. Another effect also takes
place. As the concentration of DO decreases, oxygen diffuses into the
river from the air. This process is called reaeration. As the DO
deficit increases, increasingly large amounts of oxygen diffuse into the
river. The combined actions of the microorganisms consuming the pol-
29 The correct differential equation describing the decomposition process is simply:
dx
- = -kx
dt
where k represents the "decomposition rate constant ;" x represents the concentration
of BOD; and t represents time. It should be noted that while k is a constant, the
rate at which BOD is consumed over time - is proportional to the negative of
hdt B
the concentration of BOD Wx.
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lutant in the water, the water flowing downstream, and the reaeration
effect, result in a DO profile as shown in Figure 2.30
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FIGURE 2
A TYPIcAL OXYGEN SAG CURVE
This curve is known, appropriately enough, as the oxygen sag curve.
To complicate matters, the DO sag is also affected by water temperature
(the warmer the water, the less oxygen it can dissolve and the faster
the microorganisms consume oxygen), by changes in the river's flow
rate (the faster the current, the further downstream the oxygen sag),
and by the river's cross-sectional area (which affects the rate at which
a waste discharge diffuses across the river)."'
Even when all these factors are taken into account the student of
the Delaware will not observe a DO curve precisely resembling the
simple shape depicted above. The Delaware is endowed with a hun-
dred or so significant dischargers, each at a different point in the
river, each making its own contribution to the DO profile. Moreover,
the impact on the river of many wastes is complicated by the fact
that many pollutants contain elements other than the oxygen, carbon,
and hydrogen which are the constituents of sugar. Most wastes con-
3 0 This figure is derived from one appearing in T. CAMP, supra note 25, at 294.
In this introductory explanation, we are assuming away the problems posed by the
fact that the Delaware is an estuary experiencing tidal action. These problems wvill
be discussed in detail at notes 48-91 infra & accompanying text.
31 The relationship between the factors and the DO profile was first systematically
articulated by Streeter and Phelps in an equation reproduced at note 49 inlfra.
440 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:419
tain nitrogen as well, and in these cases the biological oxygen demand
(BOD) of the material is a two-stage affair, as is shown in Figure 3.3
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OXYGEN CONSUMPTION VS. PERIOD OF INCUBATION FOR A HYDROCARBON
CONTAINING NITROGEN
Under laboratory conditions, the nitrogen in untreated wastes begins
oxidation approximately fifteen days after the test begins, in contrast to
carbonaceous activity, which begins at once. Thus nitrogenous demand
begins at a time when approximately ninety percent of the carbonaceous
activity has been exerted; this explains the hump in the curve. It should
be noted, however, that about ten percent of the carbon oxidation is yet
to occur when nitrogenous decomposition begins even in the case of un-
treated waste. Nevertheless, sanitary engineers are accustomed to
describing BOD in terms of "carbonaceous oxygen demand" (often
called "First Stage Ultimate Oxygen Demand" or FSUOD) and
"nitrogenous oxygen demand" ("Second Stage Ultimate Oxygen De-
mand" or SSUOD), although FSUOD and SSUOD cannot be pre-
cisely measured since carbonaceous demand has not ended when
nitrogenous begins.3"
3 2 This figure is derived from one appearing in T. CAMP, supra note 25, at 245.
33 Id. After the fifteenth day, when both nitrogenous and carbonaceous materials
are decaying simultaneously, the carbonaceous contribution is calculated by extra-
polating the curve based on the first 2 weeks of data, a period during which
nitrogenous activity is almost absent. The remaining excess oxygen demand pre-
vailing after the fifteenth day is attributed to nitrogenous activity. Interview with
G.D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey Staff, in Edison, N.J.,
July 1970. Moreover, it is an oversimplification to assert that nitrogenous activity
does not commence until the fifteenth day. In fact the lag before the onset of
nitrogenous demand is a function of other variables as well, including the degree of
treatment of the waste before it is dumped into the river.
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B. Sources of BOD
In addition to the discharges emitted by treatment plants owned by
riparian cities and industries, substantial loadings are imposed upon
the estuary from three other sources. Large portions of the river bot-
tom are endowed with thick sludge deposits continually in the process
of being consumed by microorganisms that require oxygen for sub-
sistence. The oxygen demand from this source (called benthic oxygen
demand) accounts for about twelve percent 1 of the total demand
imposed upon the estuary. In addition, the major cities of Trenton,
Camden, Philadelphia, and Wilmington each possess combined sewer
systems serving as conduits for both sewage and storm water run-off
from the cities' streets. This means that the sewer pipes transmit
dramatically larger volumes of waste water during and after heavy
storms. Municipal treatment facilities, alas, are not constructed to
cope with these innundations, but, rather, are built to treat the volumes
associated with sewage flows without the rain. Consequently, the four
major cities are obliged, on an average of ten rainy days a year,"5
simply to divert raw sewage cum rainwater directly into the Delaware
itself without any treatment whatsoever. These discharges account for
approximately four percent of the total annual load upon the river."
Finally, some twelve percent of the total load is contributed by the
Upper Delaware above Trenton, as well as the hundred or so tributaries
feeding into the estuary itself."
Despite the complex interaction of BOD from industry, municipal
treatment plants, river sludge, storm sewer run-off, and the estuary's
tributaries, a well defined DO profile, complete with oxygen sags, may
be discerned by a student of the estuary. It is depicted in Figure 4.3
For purposes of this analysis the river below Trenton has been divided
into thirty sections, some 10,000 feet in length and some of 20,000 feet:
At Trenton, just above the estuarine portion of the river, DO levels are
high, and indeed approach saturation. The "sag" begins immediately
below Trenton, where the combined effects of tidal action, a rapid in-
crease in depth, a decrease in velocity, and the presence of polluting
matter result in oxygen being consumed by microorganisms at a greater
34 Porges & Seizer, Allocation of Stream Capacity in the Delaware River Estuary,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND MID-ATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL WASTE CONFERENCE 71,
80 (Nov. 18-20, 1968).
35 Unpublished chapter of DECS Final Report (on file in Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Pa. Law School).
36 Porges & Seizer, supra note 34, at 80.
37 Id. So.
38 This figure is based upon one presented by G. Schaumberg, Water Pollution
Control in the Delaware Estuary 44, 1967 (unpublished thesis on file at Harvard
College Library).
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rate. The sag at Burlington, however, is followed by a slight increase
in DO, which has never been adequately explained. Up to section 7
(twenty-two miles from Trenton), just north of Philadelphia, the total
FSUOD discharge from municipal and industrial sources is relatively
small, amounting to 20,000 pounds per day for all seven sections com-
bined. At Philadelphia, however, FSUOD inputs dramatically in-
crease, averaging 75,000 pounds per day in each section through sec-
tion 22 (sixty-five miles from Trenton), which is just beyond Wil-
mington, the last major city bordering the estuary. The three major
treatment plants operated by Philadelphia contribute the lion's share of
these wastes, discharging 450,000 pounds of FSUOD daily in 1964,
which represented forty-five percent of the total FSUOD discharged by
cities and industries along the estuary. During the same year,
Camden's two plants discharged 62,250 pounds of FSUOD; Wilming-
ton dumped 87,000 pounds; the chemical plants located along the
heavily industrialized shore dumped 210,000 pounds; oil refineries,
95,000; paper plants, 30,000.
As a result of this series of discharges, DO drops precipitously in
sections 7 through 11, a distance of merely six miles, from 52 ppm to
1Y2 ppm and remains roughly constant for about the next thirty miles
through section 19, which is a bit beyond the Pennsylvania-Delaware
state line. DO begins to recover at this point since the river is increas-
ing in size as it nears the Delaware Bay, diluting the waste to a greater
degree as well as permitting accelerated reaeration. With the virtual
cessation of substantial industrial and municipal loadings at Wilming-
ton, 9 six miles beyond the state line, DO levels recover rapidly. Thus,
39 The only sizeable discharge beyond this point is contributed by an oil refinery
owned by the Getty Oil Co., located in section 26 of the river, 70 miles from Trenton.
In 1964, the DECS estimated that the refinery was discharging 2500 pounds of
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the DO level in section 25 (seventy miles from Trenton) is equal to the
DO level in section 7 (twenty-two miles from Trenton); indeed, DO
reaches near-saturation levels as the river meets the bay at Liston's
Point.40
Although this sketch of the relationship between waste discharges
containing BOD and the resulting DO profile has been oversimplified,
it suggests the magnitude of the task the DECS undertook in attempting
to explain the shape of the Delaware's DO profile. Even more impor-
tant for our purposes, it permits the beginning of an answer to the first
of the three questions to which this essay is addressed: to what extent
did the DECS attempt "to describe the facts" about DO emphasize
FSUOD per day. See Pence, Jeglic & Thomann, Tine-Varying Dissolved-Oxygen
Model, 94 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIM ENGINEERS, SANITARY
ENGINEERING DvisoN 381, 393 (1968).
40 Our description of the river is based upon the DECS measurements of BOD
loadings and DO profile obtaining in 1964. For a more precise description of the
BOD loads imposed in each section of the river, we have provided the following
chart taken from id.:
1964 WASTE LOADING IN THE DELAWARE ESTUARY, IN
POUNDS PER DAY OF CARBONACEOUS BIOCHEMICAL
OXYGEN DEMAND
Industry Tributary
(3) (4)
0 2,869
2,750 4,107
1,635 982
2,850 1,078
1,400 2,047
435 5,798
0 1,875
0 4,309
35 3,095
7,550 3,146
1,570 3,189
0 1,105
13,925 1,800
19,670 1,566
39,550 17,649
25,650 3,761
42,420 8,678
14,535 6,003
64,360 1,668
0 1,071
8,480 6,848
116,755 294
0 306
370 421
0 855
2,500 1,416
0 322
0 9,078
0 5,011
0 5,509
366,440 174,719
Storm
Water Total
Overflow BOD Source
(5) (6)
1,360 7,799
8,957
5,997
6,648
4,347
7,308
230 2,105
1,580 6,409
8,570 12,496
4,390 143,695
16,780 22,259
4,480 5,585
7,410 85,215
2,080 197,836
18,860 79,389
187,481
1,950 67,623
30,723
67,848
1,071
8,320 111,048
117,049
2,176
791
855
3,916
992
10,808
5,011
5,509
76,010 1,277,799
Section
(1)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Totals
Municipal
(2)
3,570
2,100
3,380
2,720
900
1,075
0
520
795
128,610
720
0
62,080
174,520
3,330
158,070
14,575
10,185
1,820
0
87,400
0
1,870
0
0
0
660
1,730
0
0
660,630
P,
Total
DO Sink
(7)
22,280
8,622
4,140
2,700
4,800
5,040
890
2,125
2,250
2,250
5,760
1,350
3,240
3,960
14,700
6,750
11,475
7,200
16,200
15,750
6,930
6,000
13,050
11,000
9,300
12,000
15,000
15,000
0
0
229,762
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certain aspects of the "pollution problem" at the expense of other
dimensions of equal or greater importance?
C. Shortcomings of the DO Index
We have said enough to explain why a policymaker would want to
know the DO levels prevailing at various locations along the stream
with which he is concerned. Nevertheless, a decisionmaker would be
extremely myopic if he were to adopt DO as the exclusive touchstone
of water quality. DO has little impact upon the ability of modern treat-
ment plants to process water for human consumption, so long as
anaerobic conditions producing serious odor problems are avoided.4
Turning next to a river's potential recreational uses, it is clear that DO
is far from a sufficient indicator of water quality. Although a DO near
zero indicates that a river cannot be used for swimming, fishing, or
boating because of the "river-stink" resulting from complete oxygen
depletion, a higher DO does not necessarily indicate that the river is
suitable for these uses. That a river has a relatively high DO does
not necessarily mean that the water will "look clean" to the typical
swimmer, boater, or fisherman. At present, the Delaware is an
extremely turbid river: over large sections, sunlight does not penetrate
more than two feet beneath the surface.42  Reducing BOD loads upon
4 1 The DECS recognized that increasing DO will not result in substantial mone-
tary savings for the major water treatment plant on the estuary, located at Torresdale,
Pa., which provides half of Philadelphia's water:
The major source of municipal supply that may benefit from improved
quality is the Torresdale Water Treatment Plant of Philadelphia. The fact
that this plant is able to produce a potable water from an estuarine source of
the present quality at a relatively low cost obscures the benefits picture for
water supply. It is probable that the net monetary benefits in terms of dollar
savings in treatment costs at Philadelphia's Torresdale plant will be relatively
small at the alternative levels of water quality enhancement. What may
result, however, after pollution abatement is carried out, will be a reduction
in the taste and odor problem; and therefore an increase in Philadelphia's
ability to produce a more palatable drinking water.
DECS, supra note 11, at 71.
No evidence is advanced to support the assertion that Philadelphia's water "may"
become more palatable by improving the DO curve. Philadelphia's Water Depart-
ment denies that this will occur, arguing that chlorination will still be a necessity to
eliminate disease carrying organisms, and thus whatever taste problems arise from
occasional over-chlorination will still exist. Interview with Samuel Baxter, Philadel-
phia Water Commissioner, Aug. 1970. Thus the claim that the plant's ability to
produce high quality water "may" be enhanced seems a pious hope, rather than a
well-founded estimate.
42 DECS studies indicated that, in the mid-1960's, the average depth to which
only 1% of sunlight penetrated the Delaware was 3 feet, ranging from 7 feet at
Trenton to 2 feet in the "critical regions" in the Philadelphia area. Letter from
Professor R. Thomann, Nov. 1971. More recent data are difficult to obtain, indicating
the professional pollution control community's continuing failure to transcend its
preoccupation with BOD and DO as the primary water quality parameters. During
a year in the mid-sixties, for example, the U.S. Geological Survey monitored turbidity
levels around Philadelphia. This practice was discontinued, however, both because of
uncertainty concerning the quality of the data collected and because no individual or
organization had evinced any interest in the information the USGS compiled. Tele-
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the stream will not necessarily change this dreary reality substantially
since the river's turbidity is explained in large part by tides stirring
up the river bottom, dredging operations required for large scale ship-
ping, and the introduction of large quantities of sediment from the
river's banks and tributaries. Thus, to understand the impact a cleanup
of industrial and domestic waste will have upon swimming and boating
in the Delaware, it is not sufficient to have a DO model of the river.
A model must be available that calculates the impact a cleanup will
have upon river turbidity.
It is even unclear that swimmers and boaters would benefit if an
increase in DO did in fact indicate a dramatic reduction in turbidity.
phone communications with Richard W. Paulson, U.S. Geological Survey, Harrisburg,
Pa., Sept. 1970, Apr. 1971. We have obtained informal estimates from experts who
have done substantial research on turbidity levels in the Delaware Valley. An engineer
who is the turbidity expert for the region's Army Corps of Engineers has informed
us that in most parts of the river it is impossible to see an object 2 feet below the
surface. Interview with Mr. Paul Hartzell, May 1971. Similarly, Professor Robert
E. Ricklefs, of the University of Pennsylvania's Department of Biology informs us
that along the lower Schuylkill, near the point where it joins the Delaware, the
intensity of sunlight is attenuated by 10% to 30% per centimeter. Even assuming
the lower value, this means that the intensity of sunlight 1 foot below the surface
would be less than 1% of surface levels. While Professor Ricklefs has not done
similar research on the main stem of the Delaware, he ventures to guess that results
would be comparable along large sections of the river. Personal communications
with Professor Robert E. Ricklefs, Aug. 1970, Apr. 1971. Finally, our own visual
inspections of the estuary, particularly on boat trips that extended along its entire
length, lead us to concur completely with Messrs. Hartzell and Ricklefs.
Data on present levels of photosynthetic activity are also incomplete and contra-
dictory. Dr. C. Hull, now head of the DRBC's Program Planning Brancn, did
extensive studies of this problem, and concluded that despite high turbidity levels,
significant photosynthesis was occurring. Hull, Photosynthetic Oxygenation of a
Polluted Estuary, in 3 ADVANCES IN WATER PoIiuTiro RESEARCH: PROCEEDINGS OF
THE (FIRST) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD IN LONDON SEPTEMBER 1962, at 374
(E. Pearson ed. 1964). The DECS study, however, concluded that the net produc-
tion of oxygen by photosynthetic activity was negligible. See Thomaun, Time-Series
Analyses of Water-Quality Data, 93 PROcEEDINGS OF THE AuERICAN SOcIErY OF CIvIL
ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DmvISION 1 (1967). Even assuming that Dr.
Thoman is correct and Dr. Hull completely mistaken, the present state of the
Delaware is not our fundamental concern. We are concerned about the future:
when Mr. Hartzell was asked whether the DRBC's projected cleanup would make
algae bloom, he stated that neither he nor anyone else he knew was in a position to
say. He indicated, however, that if the DRBC were not only to limit industrial and
municipal discharges but also storm sewer overflow, it could happen that turbidity
might decline sufficiently to allow significant algae growth in the shallow portions of
the river along the shore.
Our conversations with various staff members of the DRBC indicate that they
do not believe algae is presently a problem and refuse to consider the question
seriously until it becomes one. The risk is made clear, however, by another view
presented by A. Morris, a member of the DECS study group:
The Delaware Estuary above the Bay is an example of a relatively deep
estuary where the nutrients are ten to one hundred times the concentrations
theoretically necessary to cause a bloom; yet blooms don't occur. In this case,
the euphotic zone is approximately four feet, but the average depth [of the
river] is about 25'. Thus, it is hypothesized that photosynthesis is inhibited
by insufficient radiant energy.
Unpublished remarks delivered to Manhattan College Summer Institute in "Water
Pollution Control, in R. Thomann, Teaching Materials 3 (1970) (on file in Biddle
Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School).
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At present, the cloudy Delaware is a relatively inhospitable home for
algal growth precisely because the high turbidity prevents algae from
photosynthesizing nutrients like phosphates and nitrates that are abun-
dant in the water. If turbidity is reduced as a result of a BOD cleanup
campaign, the algae may be in a perfect position to multiply. Increasing
DO may simply mean that the valley is trading a brown river for a
green one.43 Per contra, if turbidity is not substantially reduced as a
consequence of a BOD cutback, the impact of an increase in DO
beyond the "river-stink" level will probably not be significant.
While aesthetics is probably the chief concern for boaters, swim-
mers are also concerned with the presence of disease-carrying organisms
and toxic chemicals, whose existence-once again-is not dependent
upon DO levels. In contrast, DO levels are of greater importance to
fishermen, assuming they are willing to fish despite aesthetic affront.
Here too, however, an adequate analysis would require an understand-
ing of the impact of heat and toxic substances upon aquatic life.
What is true of a sophisticated understanding of the recreational
uses of a river is even more true when a policymaker wishes to take into
account the longer range ecological consequences of the alternative
pollution programs he is considering. Once again, while adequate DO
levels are a necessary condition for the survival of various forms of
aquatic life, they are not a sufficient condition. Nor does the DO
profile provide an adequate basis for determining the impact the Dela-
ware has in the larger ecological balance upon which man ultimately
depends for his survival.
Paradoxically, it is only with respect to one activity that DO serves
as a relatively adequate indicator of water quality. Industries bordering
upon the river use vast quantities of water for cooling as well as other
industrial purposes. From their point of view, the DECS's use of DO
as an indicator of "water pollution" is perverse for the simple reason
that oxygen rich water corrodes piping systems at a more rapid rate."'
The more "polluted" the water is (as measured by DO), the better
it is for industrial water users. As soon as one moves beyond
industrial processes, however, to consider the relationship between water
and life, human or otherwise, the DO profile serves as an extremely
imprecise measure of "water quality": generally speaking, a high DO
is a necessary, but far from a sufficient, condition for beneficial water
use.
43 And one that will smell when the algae begin to die. Rotting matter creates
high BOD, eventually resulting in depletion of DO leading to anaerobic decomposition.
For the practical consequences to the man on the street of this same phenomenon
occurring on the Potomac, see Kohn, Warning: the Green Slime Is Here, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 22, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
44 DECS, supra note 11, at 72.
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D. Playing the Environmental Numbers Game
All this means that the use of DO as an index for "water
quality" facilitates a way of thinking about the "pollution problem"
that is fraught with danger. Once a simple number is provided as a
"proxy" for water quality, it may take on a life of its own, tempting
all concerned to evaluate alternative programs in terms of the numbers,
without asking more fundamental questions. Thus, a policymaker
guided by the DO numbers will have little difficulty locating the portion
of the Delaware River experiencing the most acute "pollution problem."
For such a policymaker, it would be "obvious" that the region between
Philadelphia and Wilmington suffering the most acute oxygen sag has
the most urgent claims on public concern. For is not water quality
"worse" there than at any other place? Is not this as "obvious" as the
fact that a DO of one ppm is lower than a DO of seven ppm? And is
it not equally obvious that society should first attempt to "solve" its
''most serious" pollution problems before moving on to solve its less
serious ones?
But why is the "pollution problem" most serious in the "critical
region" characterized by severe oxygen depletion? Is it really clear
that raising the DO level from 1 ppm to 3 or 4 or 5 ppm on the average
in the "critical sections" between Philadelphia and Wilmington will
substantially improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of the Dela-
ware Valley? Will such a numerical triumph, for example, permit the
urban masses to swim in the river? As we have suggested, there is no
reason to think so. It is even possible that increasing DO will merely
serve to transform the Delaware's color from a turbid brown to an even
more unattractive green. And what of the nasty habit indulged in by
municipalities who are obliged to discharge raw sewage into the river
whenever there are heavy rains? If achieving a DO goal of 3 or 4 or 5
ppm permits the cities to continue this practice (as is in fact the case),
will it be healthy for anyone to swim in the river for a substantial period
after each rainstorm? Regardless of the health question, will people
want to swim in the river after they have learned about the raw sewage?
Putting all this aside, how easy will it be for people to swim in the
Delaware in the "critical" region after it is "cleaned up," given the fact
that at present heavy industry occupies much of the shoreline in the
urban areas? Moreover, even if access were assured at convenient
places, how many people would want to bathe on a beach bordered on
one side by a belching chemical plant and on the other by a sewage
treatment facility? And what about the large boats that ply the river
supplying heavy industry with raw materials? Will swimmers enjoy
their sport quite as much when they encounter the wake of the latest
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intercontinental oil tanker steaming by? All these problems (and more)
must be resolved successfully before a decisionmaker intent upon pro-
viding new swimming areas would consider the region characterized by
intensive oxygen depletion important for his plans. Indeed, instead of
developing the most polluted segment of the river for this purpose, it
may be far wiser to develop one (or more) of the river's major tribu-
taries in all of the ways necessary to ensure an attractive body of water
in which people would enjoy swimming and other water-based recre-
ation activities. To achieve this goal might cost a great deal of money,
but it may well be far less than achieving even a numerical triumph in
the so-called "critical region."
For other water uses, of course, DO has greater utility as an
indicator. If fish are unable to live in the "critical region," we should
be concerned, and DO helps to indicate whether the fish will die. But
even here, keeping score by the numbers is far from sufficient. We
still must ask: why is it important to reclaim the "critical region" for
the fish? If it is to sustain a complex and variegated aquatic life
system, the absence of certain aquatic species from the river near
Philadelphia, while important, may be far from the most "critical"
ecological threat facing the valley. As we have suggested, raising DO
levels to 3 or 4 or 5 will not in and of itself transform the ecological
consequences of twentieth century urban industrialism. Some fish will
survive in, and others will more successfully migrate through, the
highly deoxygenated stretch. But to imagine that the original ecolog-
ical complexes displaced by industrialism will thereby be restored is
simply folly. In contrast, forty miles downstream from the "critical"
DO zone lies one of the few remaining major ocean-front areas in the
Northeast yet to be significantly affected by heavy industry and con-
centrated population centers. In the marshes of the lower river and
(even more importantly) the Delaware Bay, the complex interactions
between land and water characteristic of relatively untouched areas
still continues in a way whose fundamental ecological importance is only
now being appreciated. Yet without sophisticated planning, the Bay
may be transformed by urban industrialism in an all too familiar
way in the coming decades. Which, then, was the more significant
problem facing a pollution control policy in 1967: the nonexistence of
fish near Philadelphia or the preservation of the fundamental character
of the Bay? Paradoxically, it may be that the most "critical" ecological
problem arises in an area, like the Bay, which at present contains
oxygen rich water rather than in the DO sag region.
It would be premature to argue here that a sounder pollution
strategy for the Delaware would have deemphasized the importance of
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the problems generated by the oxygen poor area around Philadelphia in
order to free resources to achieve goals of the kinds suggested in the
preceding paragraphs. To make out this case persuasively will require
an extensive discussion of both the theory of cost-benefit analysis
and the attempt to apply the cost-benefit methodology by the DECS
to the Delaware. This will be the goal of the second article in this
series. Our point here is much simpler: unless great care is taken, a
"successful" effort at charting the DO profile may predispose decision-
makers to emphasize certain river uses at the expense of others; certain
ecological risks at the expense of others. It is even conceivable that
a decisionmaker can be so insensitive to the limitations of DO as a
policy indicator that he will be led to select a program that would have
been summarily rejected if the nature of the environmental control
problem had not been so dramatically simplified as a result of a "suc-
cessful" technocratic effort to chart the Delaware's DO profile.
IV. THE THOMANN MODEL'S BASIC STRUCTURE
A. Overview
Given the concerns of the model builders, it should prove no
surprise that the most important difference between each of the pro-
grams they proffered to the politicians on the DRBC was the DO level
that was set as the policy goal: the less ambitious programs were
content with relatively oxygen-poor water, while the more amibitious
insisted on higher DO levels. Moreover, it should be clear from our
previous discussion that policymakers would "naturally" be concerned
with the DO levels obtaining in the most polluted areas between Phila-
delphia and the Pennsylvania-Delaware state line, for it is in this
region that river-stink and fish-kills pose the greatest dangers. Conse-
quently, the cost-benefit chart presented earlier in this essay may ap-
propriately be amended to indicate the DO levels contemplated by each
of the proposed programs within the "critical" oxygen sag region below
Philadelphia: 4
TABLE 2
Average DO
in Most
Polluted High estimate-low estimate
Program Region Cost of benefits
I 4.5 $460 million $355-$155 million
II 4.0 250 million 320- 135 million
III 3.0 120 million 310- 125 million
IV 2.5 80 million 280- 115 million
41 This chart is derived from information to be found in DECS, supra note 11,
at 56-58, 66, 77. For a caveat regarding the cost and benefit figures appearing in
the chart, see note 23 supra.
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In our sequel, we will have a good deal to say about the accuracy of the
cost and benefit estimates presented in the Table as well as the subse-
quent estimates generated by the DECS after the DRBC had reached
its decision to accept a variant of Program II listed above. Even when
one considers the DECS's own figures, however, they reveal the nature
of the challenge confronted by the builders of the DECS DO model
when they sought to put their scientific expertise at the service of prac-
tical men of affairs. The chart demonstrates that a small improvement
in the DO profile represents a substantial additional expenditure in
pollution control. Thus, Program I achieves a one-half ppm improve-
ment in DO at twice the cost of Program II, which in turn attains a
one ppm increase at twice the cost of Program III.
This means that a relatively small error in the DO model predic-
tions will be of great importance to decisionmakers. Imagine, for
example, that instead of making perfect predictions, the DO model has
a "standard error" of one ppm. This means that there is about a two-
thirds chance the model's prediction will be within one ppm of actual
river conditions existing after any particular program is effectuated.46
Even this relatively small error would indicate that Program II, similar
to the one ultimately adopted by the DRBC, could result in DO
levels as high as Program I (costing twice as much) or as low as those
contemplated by Program III (costing half as much). Of course, by
selecting Program II instead of Program III, the agency increases the
chances that a DO level of 4.0 ppm will be attained. Nevertheless, the
intrusion of even a relatively small error into the DO predictions intro-
duces a very significant new dimension into the decisionmaker's prob-
lem: how should he orient himself to the fact of uncertainty? Should
he be risk-averse or risk-prone or risk-neutral? And as the error in
the model's prediction increases, this latter question becomes increas-
ingly important in policy formulation, dwarfing in significance the
particular cost and benefit figures generated by the model.
In short, the second question advanced earlier in this essay,*7 in-
quiring into the reliability of the model's predictions, has great impor-
tance in an ultimate assessment of the scientific factfinding process in
the present stage of its development. If the model's error is very
substantial, the Engineer may properly act with a good deal of
annoyance when the model builder proffers his information as to the
consequences of adopting one or another of the programs under con-
sideration. He may exclaim: "Any reasonable man already knew very
46 For a discussion of the term "standard error," see P. HoFL, INTRODUCTION "TO
MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 141 (3d ed. 1962).
47 See text immediately preceding sections II & III supra.
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well that if he ordered polluters to cut back their wasteloads a great
deal (as required by Program II) the water would be somewhat 'better'
than if he ordered them to cut back less (as required by Program III).
What the scientific factfinder promises is a more precise estimate of the
impact, so that policymakers can more precisely understand the benefits
to be gained by imposing a more costly program instead of a less costly
one. Yet the model's standard error is so great that it has not ap-
preciably aided the decisionmaker in this task." More important than
the Engineer's anger, however, the model's potential for error also
raises an important problem in institutional design. For if a policy-
maker were to accept cost-benefit figures that did not take into account
the risk that the promised benefits will be under- or over-fulfilled, cost-
benefit analysis would obscure a critical dimension of the issue to be
resolved. And it may be as grievous a flaw to present the illusion of
certainty as to present to the decisionmaker an incomplete or inaccurate
account of the known facts. Thus, the Engineer should be especially
concerned with the importance of designing a set of institutional con-
trols that will induce the model builder to reveal in a clear and un-
ambiguous fashion the error his predictions may contain.
In addition to considering the institutional implications of the size
of the "standard error" involved in the model's predictions, it is equally
important to determine whether the model is systematically biased so
that its predictions are consistently optimistic or pessimistic. While a
detailed examination of the model reveals elements both of optimism
and pessimism, it appears to us that the model's predictions have, in the
aggregate, a significantly overoptimistic bias. Unfortunately, we have
been unable to undertake the extensive theoretical, empirical, and com-
putational work to form a precise estimate of the extent of the bias. All
we can do here is to delineate the factors underlying our rough appraisal.
B. The Problem with Estuaries
The principal conceptual obstacle that rivers like the Delaware
(below Trenton) pose to sanitary engineers is that they are estuaries
and are therefore influenced by ocean tides. This means that BOD not
only flows downstream, but upstream as well, complicating all calcula-
tions immensely. Thus, a systematic effort at predicting the DO profile
had to await the development of the modern digital computer. Most
of the elements necessary to run a computer program, however, had
been developed much earlier in the study of nonestuarine rivers. In
1925, Streeter and Phelps, in a classic study of the Ohio River,48 de-
4 8 
H. STREETER & E. PHELPS, A STUDY OF THE POLLUTION AND NATURAL PURIFI-
CATION OF THE OHIO RIVER: 3 FACTORS CONCERNED IN THE PHENOMENA OF OXIDATION
AND REAERATION (PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE BULL. No. 146, 1925).
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veloped an equation quantifying the relationships between DO, BOD,
and the diverse factors we have already discussed.49
Nevertheless, a systematic attempt to deal with the problem of
tidal action was delayed until the 1960's, when the advent of the com-
puter made the work seem worthwhile. In 1960, O'Connor developed
the mathematical concepts that permitted the quantitative description of
the manner in which a substance discharged in a tidal estuary would
be distributed along its length over time.50 Armed with O'Connor's
contribution, Robert Thomann, then a graduate student, synthesized
this work with that of Streeter and Phelps, and developed in his
doctoral dissertation " the first systematic mathematical treatment of
an estuary with multiple pollution sources and varying temperature
and flow rate along the length of the river. Thomann then became
Technical Director of the DECS and attempted to put his model to
the empirical test.
Thomann's contribution is of classic simplicity.5 2 The eighty-six
mile estuary is divided into thirty sections, some of 10,000 and some of
49 The original Streeter-Phelps equation is:
dD
- = 2.3 (-k D+ k1L) - a,
dt
where D is the oxygen deficit in ppm, L is the first stage demand in ppm, t is the
time of flow in days, k. is the atmospheric reaeration coefficient in reciprocal days,
k. is the deoxygenation constant in reciprocal days, and a is the oxygen production
by photosynthesis in ppm per day. In the original equation a was equal to 0.
T. CAMP, stpra note 25, at 295.
50 O'Connor, Oxygen Balance of an Estuary, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DIVsIoN 35 (1960). As is
normal in such enterprises, O'Connor was obliged to make a major simplifying
assumption in order to achieve his theoretical advance. His description of tidal
action assumes both that DO measured one foot below the surface is equal to the
DO at the river's bottom and that DO levels are essentially uniform across the
width of the river. In other words, O'Connor assumes away the river's breadth and
depth. This oversimplification, while not inherent in the Thomann model, was used in
its application to the Delaware Estuary.
51 See note 17 supra.
52Although his Ph.D. thesis remained unpublished, the model developed there
and subsequent elaborations are described in a substantial literature. Some of the
significant references are: L. HTLING, THE POTOMAC ESTUARY MATHEMATICAL
MODEL (1968); R. BUNCE & L. HIETLING, A STEADY STATE SEGMENTED ESTUARY
MODEL (Federal Water Pollution Control Administration Technical Paper No. 11,
1967); L. HETLING, SIMULATION OF CHLORIDE CONCENTRATIONS IN THE POTOMAC
ESTUARY (Federal Water Pollution Control Administration Technical Paper No. 12,
1968); QuImR, LAwLER & MATUSKY, HUDSON RIVER WATER QUALITY AND WASTE
ASSIMILATIVE CAPACITY STUDY (1970) (a report done for the Div. of Pure Waters,
N.Y. Dep't of Environmental Conservation) ; G. Schaumberg, supra note 38; WATER
RESOURCE ENG'RS, INC., A WATER QUALITY MODEL OF THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN
DELTA (1965) (a report conducted for the USPHS, Div. of Water Supply and
Pollution Control, Region E); Hetling, Water Quality Models of the Estuary, in
R. DAVIS, THE RANGE OF CHOICE IN WATER MANAGEMENT; A STUDY OF DISSOLVED
OXYGEN IN THE POTOMAC ESTUARY (1968) (appendix A); Mamelak & Radziul,
Time-Varying Dissolved-Oxygen Model, Discussion, 95 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DIVISION 365 (1969);
Morris & Pence, supra note 25; O'Connor, St. John & Di Toro, Water Quality
Analysis of the Delaware River Estuary, 94 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
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20,000 feet in length. The DO level in each section is calculated by the
use of two equations-one computes the BOD load on the section; the
other describes the amount of DO both entering and leaving each
section. To determine the BOD load in each section, the model requires
data that accurately describe the amount of BOD dumped by each
pollution source on the river. This information alone, however, is
insufficient for the purposes at hand. Even if we knew, for example,
that industrial and municipal sources discharge 50,000 pounds of BOD
per day in section 3, we must know several other facts before we can
predict the amount of BOD that section 3's discharge contributes to
section 4. First, it is necessary to determine the rate at which the
50,000 pounds per day of BOD are being oxidized: if 10,000 pounds
are oxidized in section 3, only 40,000 pounds will move on to section 4.
Indeed, as we have already indicated, it is overly simple to use a single
rate of oxidation (often called the "decay rate") for all BOD materials,
since the rate at which nitrogenous oxidation occurs differs from
carbonaceous. Even after we have determined the decay rates for
FSUOD and SSUOD, however, our task will still not be completed.
To know the impact of the pollution discharged into section 3 upon
water quality in section 4, one must determine the rate at which BOD
is moving from one section to the others. The rate of movement in
turn is a function of two different factors: first, the faster the flow
downstream the faster BOD will flow in that direction; secondly, if
BOD is more concentrated in section 3 than section 4, there will be a
natural tendency for it to diffuse into section 4. (Engineers call this
latter process "advective transport." 3) Thus, it is necessary both
to know the flow rate and to have some measure of the speed at which
advective transport is taking place between sections. Using FSUOD
and SSUOD decay rates, as well as stream flow rates and a coefficient
measuring advective transport, the Thomann model not only predicts
or CIn ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DIsION 1225 (1968); Pence, jeglic
& Thomann, supra note 39; Pence, Jeglic & Thomann, Time-Varying Dissolved-
Oxygen Model, Closure, 96 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SocIETY OF CIVIL ENGI-
NEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DIVISION 179 (1970); Thomann, Mathematical Model
for Dissolved Oxygen, 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SociETy OF CInI ENGI-
NEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DmvISioN 1 (1963); Thomann, Systems Analysis and
Simulation in Water Quality Management, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE IBM SCIENTIFIC
COMPUTING SYMPOSIUM ON WATER AND AIR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 223 (1968).
Despite this documentation, however, many substantial problems have never been
canvassed in the published literature. The lack of complete documentation has made
our task more difficult than it should have been. The failure to present a systematic
and complete analysis of the Delaware stands in stark contrast to the 609 page
report issued by a similar contemporaneous investigation of the Thames Estuary.
See HER MAJESTY'S DEP'T OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUS. RESEARCH, EFFECT OF POLLUTING
DISCHARGES ON THE THAMES ESTUARY (1964) [hereinafter cited as the THAMES
REPORT].
53 The rate at which pollutants move between sections via advective transport is
affected by tidal action within the estuary, and this effect is taken into account in
the construction of the model.
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the BOD impact that polluters in section 3 will have on section 4, but
also predicts the BOD impact these polluters will have on each of the
other sections in an analogous way. Similarly, using these same four
factors, the model predicts the BOD load polluters on the other sections
of the river will place on section 3. By doing all this simultaneously, a
set of BOD concentrations in the river can be predicted, given discharges
from municipal and industrial sources. Similarly, if BOD loads from
storm sewers and tributaries, as well as their oxidation rates, are known,
an analogous calculation can be made, and the concentration of BOD
in each section can then be determined by summing the contributions
from each of the four sources-municipalities, industries, tributaries,
and storm sewers.54
From this description, it should be reasonably clear that the fol-
lowing inquiries are necessary for an assessment of the accuracy of the
model's first equation predicting BOD concentrations. How does the
theoretical formulation deal with:
(a) FSUOD and SSUOD decay rates?
(b) storm sewer run-off and tributary loads?
(c) flow and advective transport?
If the model deals with any of these factors improperly, it will sys-
tematically mis-estimate the impact of BOD discharges on the DO
profile.55
As we have already indicated, 6 the model's prediction of BOD
concentrations in each of the thirty sections is only a preliminary step
in the larger task of estimating the DO profile that can be expected from
a given set of BOD loads. To move from BOD concentrations to DO
profile, the DECS model must consider three factors that were irrele-
vant in the BOD prediction, and that are considered in the model's
second equation concerning itself with DO inputs and outputs in each
section. First, the DECS model must calculate the saturation level of
oxygen at a given temperature; secondly, it must calculate the rate at
which oxygen will diffuse into the river as BOD creates a DO deficit
in the section; thirdly, it must take into account the fact that the sludge
54 In the earlier discussion of BOD sources, a fifth source, benthic oxygen
demand, was included. See text preceding note 34 supra. In Thomann's model,
however, this source is considered in the second equation, which deals with DO
levels, and so we shall discuss it at a later stage.
55 In addition to the factors mentioned in the text the model also contains a
term that attempts to account for the impact on the DO curve of oxygen generated
by photosynthetic activity. The DECS, however, proceeded on the premise that no
net oxygen demand was exerted by this force. We have already suggested, however,
that this resolution of the problem is subject to serious question. See note 42 supra.
56 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
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deposits on the bottom of each section of the river continually consume
oxygen in the way we have described.
There is little difficulty in measuring the solubility of oxygen in
water, and hence the model's value for the saturation concentration of
dissolved oxygen at a given temperature poses no serious problem. The
same cannot be said for the other two steps by which the model moves
from BOD concentration to DO prediction, and thus we shall consider
the treatment of (a) reaeration and (b) benthic demand in detail.
C. The Steady State Assumption
Using the DECS BOD-DO model, it is in principle possible to
predict the Delaware's DO profile at any point in time. Of course, if
the policymaker wishes to predict the DO profile for a particular day
(say the July 4 peak vacation day), extensive data will be required by
the model. Not only will it be necessary to hypothesize the flow, tem-
perature, and BOD conditions prevailing on July 4, but it will also be
necessary to assume that during the month before July 4 river condi-
tions developed in a particular way, since the July 4 DO profile will in
large measure depend on the pattern of temperature, flow-rate, and BOD
discharges prevailing during the previous thirty days. Moreover, an
effort to predict the way in which DO will vary with time requires a
relatively high expenditure on computational facilities-for example, an
attempt to trace the way the Delaware's DO profile varies over the year
as a result of hypothesized weekly changes in temperature, flow rate,
and BOD inputs will occupy a highly sophisticated "third generation"
IBM 360/75 '8 some thirty minutes. And, of course, before the policy-
maker could gain a modest insight into the probable effects over time
of a given pollution control policy, a very large number of computer
runs simulating a broad range of recurring river histories would be
demanded.
To reduce the data base and computational resources required for
a "time-varying analysis" the DECS primarily attempted to predict the
DO curve on the hypothesis that the relevant river conditions remained
constant over time. This approach is so common to modelling efforts of
diverse kinds that it has its own name: the "steady state" approach.
Unfortunately, things are far from steady on the estuary. First, BOD
loads vary substantially from day to day and throughout the year.
Secondly, so does the flow-rate. Thirdly, DO varies over the course of
5 For those readers who would prefer a mathematical description of the model,
we have provided an Appendix in which the matters discussed in the immediately
preceding pages in an intuitively plausible manner are presented in a mathematical
format.
58 Interview with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey
Staff, in Edison, N.J., Oct. 1970.
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the year, as the river's temperature moves from near-freezing to as high
as 80'F. during the summertime. As the river gets colder, oxygen
becomes increasingly soluble in water-for example, at 40'F. fully
saturated water contains thirteen ppm of oxygen, while at 800F., it
contains eight ppm.59 Thus, an oxygen-rich stream can oxidize much
greater quantities of BOD during the winter without endangering
aquatic life or generating noxious odors. Even if DO levels mo-
mentarily drop to a relatively low level, the river's capacity for recovery
is much greater in the wintertime. This is because the farther away
water is from saturation, the faster oxygen diffuses into the river to
redress the imbalance. Thus, if DO is four ppm and saturation is
sixteen ppm, oxygen will diffuse three times more rapidly into the river
than if the saturation level of DO is eight ppm, ° as it is during the
summer. Finally, the microorganisms that consume BOD are much
less active as water temperature declines. As a consequence, discharges
of BOD are oxidized more slowly in the colder months, thereby per-
mitting the increased rate of reaeration then prevailing to more rapidly
counterbalance the oxidation process. For this reason the Delaware
estuary has no substantial DO depletion problem during the winter-
time. The oxygen sag is most acute from July through September,
since these summer months are characterized by high water tempera-
tures, low oxygen saturation levels, maximum biological activity, and
minimum reaeration.
This situation permitted the DECS to attempt a "steady state"
approach in analyzing important pollution problems. While it is fruit-
less to indulge in "steady state" thinking to predict DO levels prevailing
over the year, if the model builder is willing to ignore all differences
between any particular summer day and the average day for the sum-
mer, it is plausible to apply a "steady state" approach in an effort to
predict average DO throughout the summer. Although this technique
simplified the DECS factfinding problem, it inevitably introduced an
50 See T. CAmp, supra note 25, at 292. The saturation solubility of oxygen in
water is also a function of the water's salinity, though, according to DECS measure-
ments, salinity effects are minimal in the Delaware. Letter from Prof. R. Thomann,
Nov. 1971. See also THA-Es REPoRT, supra note 52, at 438.
60 The appropriate differential equation may be written
d(C,-C)
- -k,(C.-C)
dt
where C, represents the saturation concentration of DO, C represents the actual
concentration of DO, and t represents time. In words, the equation states that the
rate of change of the oxygen deficit (C.-C) with respect to time is proportional
to the negative of the difference between the saturation concentration of DO and the
actual concentration of DO.
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element of imprecision in the "steady state" model. 1  As our analysis
of the DECS equations proceeds, it shall become clear that "steady
state" thinking has important policy implications that can be easily
neglected by the factfinder anxious to reduce his own problem to man-
ageable proportions. It is to the high credit of the DECS, however,
that it did not (like so many other studies) simply ignore the limitations
of the "steady state." In spite of the difficulties, the staff applied
Thomann's general model in an effort to explore the implications of
changing river conditions in those cases in which this seemed important
to the rational formulation of policy. We shall assess the success of
these efforts in our exploration of the model's structure and perform-
ance, which follows.
V. THE THOMANN MODEL: SOURCES OF ERROR
A. The BOD Equation
1. Treatment of Decay Rates
DRBC officials, using DECS data, report that in 1964 carbona-
ceous oxygen demanding materials dumped by industries and cities
accounted for fifty-three per cent of the total BOD in the estuary, while
nitrogenous oxygen demand from these sources represented twenty-two
percent of the total BOD load.62  With the adoption of the new
DRBC control program, however, the relative importance of carbona-
ceous demand (FSUOD) and nitrogenous demand (SSUOD) will
shift dramatically since, under DRBC requirements, each of the firms
and cities bordering on the estuary will be required within the near
future to build "secondary treatment" facilities that reduce FSUOD by
eighty-seven to ninety-three percent but that reduce SSUOD to a much
smaller degree."3 We must therefore scrutinize with special care the
61 The DECS reports that the standard day to day deviation around the summer
average in a typical section of the river is 0.3 ppm. That is to say, if the DECS
predicted the summer average DO concentration, the actual concentration would be
within 0.3 ppm of this value on approximately 2 days out of 3 and would be within
0.6 ppm of this value on 95% of the days. Thomann, supra note 42, at 22. Given
the methodological frailties in the DECS "verification" analysis, to be considered at
text accompanying notes 115-29 infra, we have, however, little confidence in the
reliability of this DECS estimate.
62 See Porges & Selzer, supra note 34, at 75, 80.
63 Most "primary" and "secondary" treatment plants are designed primarily for
the purpose of removing FSUOD. Measurements of the efficiency of SSUOD
removal by 5 different treatment plants may be found in Barth, Mulbarger, Salotto
& Ettinger, Removal of Nitrogen by Municipal Wastewater Treatment Plants, 38
J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FFDERATION 1208-18 (1966). The following table
summarizes the results (in some cases, 2 test periods were selected) :
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manner in which the model predicts the impact SSUOD will have upon
DO after the cleanup program is completed.
As we have explained, laboratory tests indicate that no substantial
nitrogenous demand is exerted by untreated waste until approximately
fifteen days after the substance is introduced into the water,64 because
a substantial period of time is required before nitrogen consuming
bacteria reproduce in such numbers that a significant oxygen demand
ensues. To take into account the delayed response time, the DECS
treated the nitrogenous component of a discharge as if it occurred at a
place farther down the river than its actual point of entry.65
This procedure suffers from several important defects. First, un-
like the laboratory, large numbers of nitrogen consuming micro-
organisms already exist in the river before a given BOD sample is
dumped, since they have been feasting upon prior nitrogenous dis-
charges. Thus, it does not follow that the fifteen day nitrogenous lag
observed in the laboratory will also take place in the river.66 Moreover,
subsequent investigators have explained the nitrogen lag phenomenon
on more plausible grounds, with which the DECS model altogether
Plant Period Efficiency of Nitrogen. Removal in %
Primary Secondary Overall
Treatment Treatment Removal
A I 9 57 61
B I -27 34 16
II 2 20 22
C I 5 8 13
II 28 42 58
D I 0 30 30
E I 17 25 38
II 19 8 25
The data indicate that treatment plants containing both primary and secondary phases
removed from 13% to 61% of SSUOD, with the average removal being 33%o.
64 See text preceding note 33 szpra; id. 1217 (Table V).
6 5 The THAMES REPORT, supra note 52, at 212, provides a good statement of
accepted doctrine concerning the delayed response of nitrogenous oxygen demand:
This [delayed response] is believed to be because the concentration of nitrify-
ing bacteria initially present is usually small and because the rate of growth
of these organisms is slow, especially when compared with that of the hetero-
trophic bacteria which oxidize carbon; the rate of oxidation of nitrite to
nitrate is particularly slow in the initial stages since it tends to be limited by
the rate of formation of nitrite from ammonia.
66 Indeed, subsequent unpublished course materials prepared by Professor Thomann
indicate that this assumption was faulty:
In the BOD test, there is a pronounced lag between the carbonaceous oxida-
tion and the nitrification step, the latter following by as much as ten days.
The lag is less for the treated samples and is on the order of one or two days
for highly treated effluents. In the stream, the two stages frequently proceed
simultaneously, although there may be lags in the nitrification stage in highly
polluted streams, or those with low dissolved oxygen.
R. Thomann, Reactions, at 24, undated (section of untitled, unpublished materials on
file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School).
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fails to deal. O'Connor, in a 1966 study of the DECS model, 7 argues
persuasively that the microorganisms that oxidize nitrogenous waste
do not thrive in conditions in which large carbonaceous loads deplete
oxygen levels greatly. Consequently, when carbonaceous loadings are
reduced, nitrifying bacteria-whose growth was formerly frustrated-
will flourish and generate substantial oxygen demand in precisely those
areas in which the DO deficit is currently most critical. This means
that as the current DRBC program succeeds, the predictive powers of
the model will progressively deteriorate, since the nitrogenous share of
total load will be increasing and the distribution of this load will be
altered and move upstream into the area between Philadelphia and the
Pennsylvania-Delaware state line, the area of maximum oxygen deficit,
in ways that the model was powerless to predict at the time of the
DRBC decision."
There is, then, not only a source of error in the model's structure
but one that will systematically yield overly optimistic predictions as to
the consequences of ambitious cleanup programs upon the DO profile,
especially in the most polluted river sections. We have not attempted
to develop alternative modes of dealing with SSUOD in an effort to
determine precisely the degree of error involved in the DECS model,
since such an attempt would require very extensive theoretical and
empirical investigation. Nevertheless, the importance of even a
moderate error cannot be underestimated when it is recalled that the
model is being used to delineate the costs and benefits of alternative
water quality programs that may differ by hundreds of millions of
dollars in their cost but that differ only by one ppm in their impact on
the DO curve in the most polluted sections of the Delaware.6"
In addition to the structural failures in the treatment of SSUOD
decay, the DECS also utilized a questionable procedure in its attempt to
measure the rate at which both FSUOD and SSUOD decayed in each
section. The decay rate in each section was estimated from laboratory
experiments upon samples of Delaware River water from that section.70
This indeed seems to be a sound method for estimating decay rates as
of 1964 (before the cleanup) except for a caveat we shall discuss in a
67D. O'Connor, Water Quality Analysis of the Delaware River Estuary 45,
1966 (an unpublished report made for the Industrial Subcommittee of the Technical
Advisory Committee, Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study, on file in Biddle Law
Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School).
68 Id. 51-52.
069 Further work on this problem has been attempted subsequent to the publication
of the "preliminary" DECS Report of 1966 and the DRBC decision of 1967. See
text accompanying note 154 infra. Our concern at this point in the essay, however,
is to analyze in detail the validity of the information provided to the decisionmakers
at the time they made their decision.
70 Interview with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey
Staff, in Edison, N.J., July 1970.
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footnote."1 But what of the situation after cleanup? There is no reason
to believe that a decay rate for a given section in 1975, after cleanup
measures are taken, will equal the decay rate in 1964. The best
evidence available indicates that the more treatment wastes receive
before entering the river, the slower they will decay thereafter."2 Thus,
as pollution loads on the river decrease, the decay rates will probably be
less than those found formerly. The effect of this will be to shift the
oxygen sag downstream, though to what extent we cannot guess.
2. Combined Sewers and Raw Sewage
Four percent of the total BOD discharged into the river during the
year is contributed by the raw sewage discharged during heavy rains by
the combined sewer systems operated in Trenton, Camden, Philadelphia,
and Wilmington." The relatively small annual contribution from this
source, however, grossly understates its importance in policy formula-
tion. For the sewers do not discharge relatively small amounts of
effluent continuously, but enormous quantities sporadically. Since the
sewers overflow about ten days a year,74 the four percent annual per-
centage means that the total BOD contributed by raw sewage during
and after a stormy period can exceed the BOD from all other sources
combined."5 Moreover, the bulk of these untreated wastes will be
emitted by Philadelphia and Camden, thereby threatening oxygen re-
serves at the core of the "critical area" already characterized by severe
oxygen depletion. Thus, it is of prime importance to a decisionmaker
to understand the impact raw sewage will have on DO on those occa-
sions on which it is present in quantity. Indeed, if the model builder
only provided the summer average DO to be anticipated in the critical
region, in the manner conveyed by Table 2, the information could be
profoundly misleading. For example, Table 2 reports that pollution
Program II (costing $250 million) will achieve an average DO of four
ppm during the summer, while Program III (costing $120 million)
71 The caveat centers upon the DECS assumption that the river water samples
measured in the laboratory decay in the same manner as they would under river
conditions. Two leading authorities point out that the assumption that the rate of
consumption of organics in laboratory equipment is equal to the rate of consumption
in natural waste "overlooks the fact that the biophysical as well as the biochemical
environment of BOD bottles cannot possibly be like that of every kind of stream,
even when the temperature of incubation of the bottles is that of the stream water."
G. FAIR & J. GEYER, WATER SUPPLY AND WASTE-WATER DisPosAL 835 (1954).
Nevertheless, these authors claim that, in general, there seems to be a relatively good
correlation between river and lab decay rates, as well as between laboratory and river
BOD consumption rates. Id. 835-36.
7 2 
THAMES REPORT, supra note 52, at 216, 226.
73 Text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
74 Text accompanying note 35 supra.
75 See detailed discussion to be found in notes 80-81 infra.
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will achieve an average DO of three ppm. Thus, on the surface, the
more expensive program seems to promise more varied forms of aquatic
life even in the heavily polluted region. If, however, the intermittent
discharge of raw sewage will for sustained periods reduce DO levels to
two ppm under Program II and one ppm under Program III, the more
expensive program's promise of a more extensive aquatic life will in
large part be illusory, since living things must breathe all of the time,
not most of the time. On the other hand, it may be that Program II
will assure varied aquatic life even during the intermittent inundations
of raw sewage while Program III will not. But if there is a real differ-
ence between the two programs in this respect, it surely is not obvious.
It is precisely issues of this kind that led decisionmakers to search for
expert factfinders in the first place.
Despite its importance for the rational formulation of policy, the
DECS "steady state" model was incapable of treating the storm over-
flow problem in a way that would clarify its dimensions. For it should
be recalled "0 that the fundamental limitation of a "steady state" model
lies precisely in its assumption that river conditions remain constant
over time. Given this framework, the "steady state" model builders, in
making their predictions, were forced to assume that the sewers were
constantly emitting a BOD flow equal to four percent of the total load-
ing. Consequently, the "summer average" DO level DECS associated
with each of the proposed programs slightly understates the DO that
could be anticipated during dry spells but grossly overstates the impact
of pollution control during and after heavy rains. Thus, "steady state"
thinking could easily induce policymakers to overestimate the benefits
of embarking upon any of the programs under consideration: it
obscures the probability that none of the programs under consideration
would significantly alter environmental conditions unless the sewer
problem were resolved. Once this possibility is raised, its policy impli-
cations can be seen to have critical importance. If it is necessary to
eliminate the storm sewer problem in order to generate substantial
environmental improvements in the "critical sections," the costs of
"meaningful" pollution control become enormous. "Solving" the raw
sewage problem would require a city like Philadelphia to rip up most
of its busy streets and replace the present sewer piping system with one
that would prevent raw sewage from sweeping into the Delaware during
heavy rains. To accomplish this objective, it would be necessary to
segregate sanitary sewage from rain water runoff by placing wastes in
a completely separate piping system from the one used to transport
76 Notes 60-61 supra & preceding & accompanying text.
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rainwater. In this two pipe system, which is common in more recently
developed communities, municipal treatment plants are not overloaded
with rainwater for the simple reason that the rain pipes conduct the
relatively unpolluted runoff to the river directly. Since the water in
the pipe carrying domestic and industrial waste does not expand during
the stormy periods, it is perfectly feasible for the city plant to treat the
waste on foul, as well as fair, days before discharging it into the river.
While installing a two-pipe system would "solve" the raw sewage
problem, such a solution would not only cause Philadelphia's inhabitants
substantial inconvenience but would cost the public fisc a sum in
excess of a billion dollars.77 Are costs of this magnitude worth the
benefits to be gained when even after the sewer problem is "solved," it
is far from clear that the river's "critical" section will be a pleasant
place for swimming, let alone a refuge for the sensitive man seeking
communion with nature, undisturbed by the vulgar evidence of urban
industrialism? If, however, the costs of installing new piping systems
far exceed the benefits, what is the justification for embarking on any
of the cutback programs tendered by DECS to DRBC? Is there any
reason to believe that, absent the elimination of raw sewage, the reduc-
tion of BOD from other sources contemplated by Programs I or II or
III or IV will significantly improve the bleak environmental picture in
the "critical" region? Unless there is a thoroughgoing effort to clean
up the Delaware, will half-measures, however expensive, make a real
difference? When faced with the costs of a thoroughgoing effort, do
we still want to clean up the "critical" region? These fundamental
questions can be avoided only by remaining within the confines of
"steady state" thinking; for once the intermittent flood of raw sewage
is treated as if it were a constant trickle, the policy problems evaporate.
While the cost-benefit analysis presented in Table 2 does not
transcend the "steady state" approach and hence fails to consider these
basic questions, the DECS scientific staff, led by Dr. Thomann, at-
tempted some "time varying analyses," which cast light on the impor-
tance of the storm run-off problem. For example, the staff's model
predicted that a sudden temporary impulse of 200,000 pounds of BOD
introduced into section 15 (in the middle of the river's "critical region")
would induce a temporary decline of .15 ppm of DO in that section dur-
77 The costs of separating the combined sewer systems presently serving some
60 million Americans are enormous, with estimates seeming to cluster around the
$50 billion figure. See 2 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ANNUAL REPORT
145 (1971) ; Starr & Carlson, Pollution and Poverty: The Strategy of Cross-Commit-
ment, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1968, at 104, 122. While no solid estimates for
Philadelphia have been developed, we have encountered no knowledgeable observer
who would dispute the billion dollar price tag suggested in the text.
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ing the following week. 7s The DECS staff, however, nowhere suggests
that storm run-off will be limited to a mere 200,000 pounds when it
occurs.7 '  Rather, as we have suggested, DECS data indicate that a
heavy storm may induce an impulse far in excess of 1.2 million pounds
of FSUOD per day in the "critical region." 80 Thus, if the four ppm
summer average predicted for the "critical region" by the DECS
"steady state" model had been correct in all other respects, a "time
varying" analysis would imply that during the week after a heavy
storm, DO in the Philadelphia metropolitan area could plummet to
three ppm or even less."' Unfortunately, while the DECS "time vary-
ing" effort itself suggested the seriousness of the storm sewer problem,
the implications of its analysis were not articulated in the "preliminary"
report tendered to decisionmakers in 1966.
78 DECS, supra note 11, at 41 (Figure 29). The maximum decrease in DO is
predicted to occur some 2 or 3 days after the 200,000 pounds is introduced into the
system. Of course, the discharge in section 15 also has a significant impact in other
sections. For example, the maximum decrease in DO in section 18 is .1 ppm and occurs
5 days after discharge; while in section 24 (downstream from the "critical zone" of
oxygen depletion) the maximum impact is about .02 ppm some 2 weeks after the
discharge.
79 In discussing these findings in its 1966 Report, the DECS does not even refer
to the problem posed by raw sewage runoff. Rather, its calculation of a .15 ppm
DO decline is premised upon the analysis of a "short duration discharge such as an
accidental spill." Id. 41.
80We arrive at this conclusion by 2 different complementary routes. DECS
indicates that, at present, Philadelphia's 3 major plants discharge 450,000 pounds of
FSUOD per day after the waste is treated by presently existing processes that remove
approximately half of the FSUOD. Thus, when a major rainfall requires the plants
to dump their wastes without treating them, it is reasonable to expect an added impulse
of 450,000 pounds of FSUOD per day to be imposed upon the system. Moreover,
the organic debris on the city's streets will also be swept into the river without
treatment, adding an unknown but surely very substantial BOD input. Similarly,
Camden's 2 plants, after treatment (of about 50%), discharged 62,250 pounds in 1964
and so can be expected to impose an extra impulse of 62,500 pounds during storms,
together with a substantial addition contributed by street debris. Thus, under 1964
conditions, BOD well in excess of 600,000 pounds of FSUOD will be introduced by
Philadelphia and Camden. Under the pollution control program adopted by the
DRBC (a variant of Program II in Table 2), however, both cities will be required
to reduce FSUOD by 85% to 90% instead of 50%. Thus, when treatment is made
impossible by storm overflow, these cities will contribute each day of the storm an
added impulse of 1.2 million pounds of FSUOD plus the very considerable quantity
of street debris flushed into the river by the rain.
An even more depressing conclusion can be reached by considering another set of
DECS data. Since it is reported that storm overflow accounts for 4% of the annual
load on the estuary, and since it is also reported that overflow occurs approximately
10 times a year, Porges & Seizer, supra note 34, at 75, 80, simple mathematical
calculation indicates that the impulse of untreated sewage for an average storm will
be 2.5 to 3 million pounds of BOD. Since the vast majority of these wastes will be
contributed by Philadelphia and Camden, the consequences of the storm sewer problem
seem more serious than even the prior discussion suggests.
81 Since the model's equations are linear, see Appendix infra, there is no difficulty
in assuming, as does the text, that if 200,000 pounds of BOD depresses DO by .15
ppm, 1.2 million pounds will depress DO by exactly 6 times that amount.
It is also true that not all of the storm overflow will be imposed in only one of
the estuary's "critical sections ;" nevertheless, it is clear that the bulk will be imposed
over no more than a 6 or 7 mile stretch of the river, and it is equally clear, see
note 78 supra, that this distance will not substantially ameliorate the storm runoff's
impact on DO.
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3. Loads Imposed by non-Estuarine Branches of the Delaware Basin
A similar defect afflicts the DECS treatment of the loads imposed
on the estuary by the Upper Delaware 8 2 and the tributaries to the main
stem. DECS reports that in 1964 twelve percent of total FSUOD was
contributed by these sources."' Once again, however, these loads do not
remain constant over time; there is a periodic cycle in which BOD in-
puts reach an annual peak between April and June as a result of the
normal springtime thaw. Thus during April of 1964 the Upper Dela-
ware dumped an average of 168,500 pounds of FSUOD each day;
during the month of August only 40,200 pounds was discharged."
Nevertheless, the DECS used an annual average to express the load
placed on the river in its mathematical model. The significance of
ignoring seasonal variations of such substantial dimensions can be
appreciated when it is recognized that the entire city of Philadelphia,
which contributed some forty-five percent of the carbonaceous load
dumped by all of the cities and firms along the estuary in 1964, is
limited to 131,500 pounds of FSUOD under the allocation plan adopted
by the DRBC.s5 Similarly, "steady state" thinking assumed away the
fact that BOD discharges from the tributaries can be expected to be
especially severe during stormy periods when debris from city streets
and rural countryside is flushed into the river system.
The DECS treatment of the tributaries and Upper Delaware was
defective in yet another respect. Our inspection of unpublished DECS
documents reveals 86 that the study assumed that in this case SSUOD
was equal to FSUOD. From all that appears from even the unpublished
documentation-which is inadequate-no data exist to support this
82 It is not clear exactly what figure was used by the DECS to represent the
average load imposed by the upper Delaware upon the estuary at Trenton. While
the published literature indicates that 22,000 lbs. was used as the FSUOD loading,
see table at note 40 supra, there has clearly been an omission of a large load of
approximately 86,000 lbs. in the tributary inputs listed in the table, since the individual
loads do not sum up to the total load. Contradicting the published work, an unpub-
lished chapter of the final DECS Report indicates the existence of an FSUOD load
at Trenton of 84,993 lbs. and an SSUOD load at Trenton of 84,593 lbs. When we
inquired at the DRBC concerning this substantial discrepancy we were told that the
initial loadings used were corrected upward. It is unclear, however, whether any
effort has been made to chart the DO consequences of this substantial adjustment of
BOD inputs.
83 Note 37 supra & accompanying text
84 FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADmINIsTRATIOx, U.S. DEPT Or THE
INTERIOR, DECS REPORT No. BDZ (basic stream quality data sheets nos. 27 & 28)
(estimates based on unpublished data from Water Resources Div., Geological Survey,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, undated (available in file no. 4639, Trenton, New Jersey)).
8 5 Unpublished table of waste load allocations provided by the DRBC, on file in
Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
86These documents have been made available to us by an anonymous non-
governmental source.
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assumption. 7  Thus, once again, the DECS treatment of nitrogenous
demand appears to suffer from an overly large dose of simplification.ss
4. The Data Base Sources for Error
To test the reliability of its model, the DECS staff attempted to
"predict" the then existing DO profile on the basis of the BOD inputs
being exerted upon the estuary. To undertake this task, it was neces-
sary to embark upon a systematic monitoring program of the BOD
loadings imposed by cities, tributaries, the Upper Delaware, and the
sludge. While we do not have adequate information to permit a fair
assessment of the way in which the DECS monitored the BOD levels
from many of these sources, we can consider the effectiveness of the
program that measured the FSUOD and SSUOD dumped by the cities
and municipalities along the river during 1964.89
The DECS selected forty-four of the largest polluters, whose waste-
loads accounted for more than ninety percent of all industrial and mu-
nicipal effluent, for sustained analysis. DECS did not carefully measure
the BOD loads of middle-sized and small municipalities included in their
sample but, rather, derived their imputed BOD loads by using a rule-
of-thumb formula, which as we shall see in a subsequent essay, was
extremely imprecise.90 Moreover, in addition to biochemical oxygen
demand, certain large plants discharge large quantities of chemicals that
8 7 Professor Thomann explains that the 1:1 ratio of FSUOD to SSUOD is
"generally supported" by available sanitary engineering literature. Letter to the
authors, Nov. 1971. However this may be, the ratio is not supported by empirical
study of the relevant tributarial conditions, and it does not seem consistent with the
FSUOD-SSUOD ratios that were generated by measurements on the Delaware's
main stem, which suggested that SSUOD played a smaller role than is implied by
the 1:1 relationship.
88 The reader will recall that the model also attempts to relate flow and advective
transport to the distribution of BOD concentrations on the estuary. Text accompany-
ing notes 53-54 stpra. So far as flow is concerned, no significant conceptual or
measurement problems arise. Although many problems arise in the treatment of
advective transport, these problems may safely be ignored by the average reader,
since DO predictions are insensitive even to large changes in the advective transport
coefficient. Telephone conversation with R. A. Norris of Quirk, Lawler, and Matusky,
Consulting Engineers, N.Y., N.Y., Aug. 1970; interview with N. Jaworski, Middle
Atlantic Region FWQA, in Annapolis, Md., Aug. 1970; interview with G. D. Pence,
Jr., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey Staff, in Edison, N.J., July 1970. For a
more detailed discussion, see L. HETLING, SIMUImuTIo OF CHLORIDE CONCENTRATIONS
IN THE PoToatAc ESTUARY (Federal Water Pollution Control Administration CB-
SRBP Technical Paper No. 12, 1968); Dispersion Coefflcient in the Delaware River
Estuary as a Function of Fresh Water, 6 WATER RESOURCES RE R H 516 (1970) ;
R. Paulsen, The Longitudinal Diffusion Coefficient in the Delaware River Estuary as
Determined from a Steady-State Model, 5 WATER REsoURcEs RES iAcH 59 (1969).
89 The program is explained in DECS, supra note 11, at 20-23.
90 Unpublished documents indicate that the formula was: (number of inhabitants
within service area) (0.286) = FSUOD.
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react directly with dissolved oxygen in the water, thereby causing an
additional depletion of DO. This factor was not taken into account.91
5. The BOD equation: The Proof of the Pudding
Our discussion of the defects in the basic BOD equation, in the
DECS estimation of the decay coefficients, and in its measurement of
BOD inputs leads us to the conclusion that the model's estimation of
BOD loads in each section will have a very substantial error when it
attempts to predict the summer average BOD concentrations prevailing
at the time of the DECS study. While there are elements in the DECS
approach that may overestimate the amount of BOD afflicting the
estuary during the summer months,"2 the BOD analysis as a whole is
unduly optimistic in its appraisal of the possibilities of cleanup. Es-
pecially in its treatment of nitrogenous demand and the raw sewage
discharged by combination sewers the analysis conceals highly important
factors that may well erode substantially (or entirely) the benefits
anticipated from the various program options proffered by the DECS
to the political actors on the DRBC. Given the limited resources at
our command, we have been unable to undertake the substantial work
required before a precise estimate of the model's error could be at-
tempted. We are aware, however, of one study in which a skilled
investigator has attempted to determine the extent to which the DECS
model accurately predicts BOD. When Professor O'Connor considered
this question in a 1966 paper, DECS provided him with all their data,
thereby permitting him to determine in a reliable way the power of the
model's BOD equation. When O'Connor compared the predicted and
actual BOD profiles, he found extraordinary disparities between
DECS estimates and the river's realities. We reproduce, opposite, the
graph that best demonstrates the extreme discrepancies.
O'Connor's data demonstrate a consistent tendency of DECS to
understate the magnitude of BOD concentrations in the estuary, provid-
ing additional evidence of the overoptimistic tendency we have
adduced. 4
91 This is termed chemical oxygen demand. While this type of waste is not
present in discharges from most plants, in at least 2 plants there is a large chemical
oxygen demand; in some others there is a significant chemical oxygen demand. These
statements are based on interviews with polluters along the estuary and from our
inspection of files available at the Dep't of Environmental Resources in Harrisburg,
Pa., and the Dep't of Environmental Protection in Trenton, N.J.
92 We refer to the likely change in decay rate after the DRBC's treatment pro-
gram is effectuated, see text accompanying note 72 supra, and the use of an annual
average to depict the impact of BOD introduced by the Upper Delaware on summer
DO, see text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
93 See Table 2, text accompanying note 45 supra.
94 O'Connor, supra note 67, Fig. 11. O'Connor notes that "The correlation of
BOD data is observed to be unsatisfactory." Id. 48. He then adds, "However, if a
background level of 2.0 mg/l, a value frequently observed above known sources of
pollution at Trenton, is assigned to the system, better agreement would be realized."
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FIGURE 5
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND PREDICTED BOD FOR AUGUST 1964
B. The DO Equation
Thus far, our analysis has focused on the first of the two equations
used in the DECS model, whose purpose was to predict BOD concen-
trations along the estuary. On the basis of these BOD concentrations,
the model's second equation calculates the DO concentrations to be
expected. An analysis of this second equation (called the "DO equa-
tion") reveals two important additional sources of error.
1. Reaeration
In a river suffering an oxygen deficit, oxygen begins to move
through the air-water interface, reducing the deficit over time until the
saturation point of DO is reached in the river. One of the major tasks
of the DECS DO equation is to describe accurately the rate at which
this reaeration process takes place. Two major difficulties arise with
the model's estimation of reaeration rate-one is of fundamental con-
ceptual importance; the other involves the way in which reaeration is
Id. These 2 short sentences constitute the complete discussion of the discrepancy
involved. Given the importance of ascertaining the reliability of the model's BOD
predictions, this laconic discussion is extraordinary. Moreover, the suggestion that
the model's predictive powers would be improved by adding an arbitrary constant of
2 ppm is advocating the use of a "fudge" factor well known in engineering circles.
Such factors have 2 notable defects. First, they represent unexplained behavior in
the system; it is more productive to recognize this harsh reality than to gloss over it.
Secondly, fudge factors may not remain constant over time as O'Connor assumes.
Even if one were to assign the 2 ppm background level as O'Connor suggests, one
would have no way of knowing whether an identical constant should be assigned
after cleanup activities have been completed. Thus, it is evident that the model
predicts BOD behavior very badly, and the introduction of "assigned" factors, as
suggested by O'Connor, would only make the problem worse. The way to handle
"background BOD," if empirical data prove this concept tenable, would be to explicitly
include it as a term in the model's predicting equations.
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measured. As is often the case, the error in conception and the error
in measurement are closely related.
The technical literature contains numerous proposed equations for
the prediction of reaeration coefficients (constants reflecting the rate at
which oxygen is replaced by aeration), yielding values that vary sub-
stantially from one another. DECS used values, for example, that were
derived from a 1958 paper by O'Connor and Dobbins " and vary con-
siderably from those proposed by more recent researchers." We have
provided the reader with a footnote illustrating these substantial dif-
ferences in tabular form. 7
The differences in measurement, however, only suggest a funda-
mental conceptual problem. Overwhelming evidence developed by
British investigators supports the intuitive notion that wind velocity at
95 O'Connor & Dobbins, Mechanism of Reaeration in Natural Streams, 123 TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE AMRIcN SocIrEY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING
DrvisioN 641 (1958). The inference that the equation used by DECS was the one
derived in this paper may be drawn from the fact that it was the reaeration equation
used for the time varying model. See Pence, jeglic & Thomann, supra note 39, at 381.
96 P. Krenkel, Turbulent Diffusion and the Kinetics of Oxygen Absorption (un-
published dissertation, Univ. of Calif. Berkeley); Churchill, Elmore & Buckingham,
The Prediction of Stream Reaeration Rates, 88 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DVISION 1 (1962). See also
Krenkel & Orlob, Turbulent Diffusion and the Reaeration Coefficient, 88 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETy OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DmsioN
53 (1962).
97 As the following chart indicates, the reaeration rate is a function of channel
depth and flow rate, among other factors.
Values of Reaeration Coefficients
O'Connor and Krenkel-
For a deep channel (40') Dobbins Churchill Orlob
Velocity 1'/sec. 0.051 0.024 0.063
2 0.072 0.048 0.125
3 0.088 0.072 0.188
4 0.102 0.096 0.250
For a shallow channel (5')
Velocity 1/sec. 0.407 0.249 0.250
2 0.577 0.498 0.500
3 0.706 0.747 0.750
4 0.814 0.996 1.000
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, A WATER QUALITY MODEL OF THE SAN JOAQUIN
DELTA 44 (1965). The complexity of the process of estimating reaeration rates
will be appreciated when it is noted that the depth of the Delaware Estuary varies
from 16 to 34 feet. See Pence, Jeglic & Thomann, supra note 39, at 390. Flow
velocities in the Delaware, at the Delaware Memorial Bridge, moreover, vary
from -3 ft./sec. to +3 ft./sec. as a consequence of tidal action. See DECS, supra
note 11, at 13. This further complicates the analysis.
Dr. Clifford Russell, of Resources for the Future, in his extremely useful written
commentary upon an earlier draft of this essay, suggests that our criticism of the
DECS's reliance on the O'Connor-Dobbins reaeration coefficients ignores the fact that
the values for deep channels like the Delaware generally fall between the values
given by the other 2 equations. While this is true, we do not find it overly comforting.
Although the values do fall between the other 2 sets, there remains a very substantial
disparity between the 3 equations, which remains extremely important given the
admitted sensitivity of the DECS DO prediction to the particular reaeration co-
efficients selected.
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the water's surface is a critical determinant of reaeration rate. When
the wind was blowing at twenty miles per hour, oxygen entered the
Thames more than five times as rapidly as when there was no wind.98
Yet none of the estimates cited above consider wind velocity. More-
over, the O'Connor-Dobbins equation was derived principally from a
study of non-tidal rivers. 9 Since "[i]n an estuary the adjustment for
the effects of waves is likely to be of greater importance than in fresh-
water streams," 100 because of increased wind velocities and tidal action,
the accuracy of the O'Connor-Dobbins equation in the context of the
Delaware seems doubtful.
More is involved than the question whether the DECS equation is
correct. At stake is the validity of the DECS assumption that reaera-
tion can be described properly by the use of an equation not containing
wind velocity as an independent variable. The Thames study, which
was available to DECS, demonstrates that this assumption is unten-
able,' 01 and we are frankly at a loss to understand why the DECS never
confronted the problem. Once the issue is articulated, it is apparent
not only that wind velocity should be included but that no single reaera-
tion coefficient can be expected to prevail in a given section at all times.
Instead, a sophisticated approach would first attempt to determine the
range of probable values associated with varying wind velocities on each
section of the Delaware. Then, at a minimum, it would develop a co-
08 THAMIES REPORT, supra note 52, at 357-58.
99 The equations for predicting the reaeration coefficient were based on theories
of water circulation applicable only to non-estuarine rivers that experience neither
tidal action nor heavy wave motion. Although nearly all verification of the reaeration
coefficients predicted by the equation was based upon data from non-estuarine rivers,
some data were used from San Diego Bay, and agreed with the predicted values
rather well. An examination of the Thames Report on this problem suggests that
the agreement between San Diego Bay data and the estimating equation is probably
a coincidence. THrms REPORT, supra note 52, at 569. A recent paper makes the
DECS methodology appear even more vulnerable. Juliano, Reaeration Measurements
in an Estuary, 95 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AmERicAN SocIETY OF CIvIL ENGINEERS,
SANITARY ENGINEERING DIviSION 1165 (1969), reports:
Extensive measurements and investigation of the reaeration constant and
its controlling mechanisms suggests [sic] that surface reaeration in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta does not lend itself to mathematical definition.
[ . . T]he writer feels that reaeration is best determined by methods which
take into account each system's unique environmental conditions.
Surface turbulence proved to be the most important factor controlling
diffusion. Wind velocity is the most significant parameter causing surface
turbulence. A specific wind velocity will result in varying degrees of surface
turbulence depending on channel size and configuration, tidal phase, levee
height, and wind direction. This accounts for the appearance of a more or
less random variation in reaeration.
. . . The magnitude of surface reaeration is best determined by in situ
measurements which consider the complex action and interactions of environ-
mental factors effecting the reaeration constant.
Id. 1176-77.
LOO THAMES RErORT, supra note 52, at 569.
101 Id.
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efficient based upon the average wind speed in the particular section
under consideration. In fact, it would be possible to develop a more
sensitive approach that would explicitly make reaeration a function of
wind velocity. If this were done, one could give the administrator an
indication of the range in which DO would fluctuate as wind speed
changes. The importance of the DECS failure to conceptualize the
reaeration problem properly, which led to the use of a questionable co-
efficient, is recognized once one takes into account the candid admission
by the DECS staff, supported by the testimony of other experts who
have worked with similar models, that the model's predictions are ex-
tremely sensitive to changes in the reaeration value.
102
2. Benthic Demand
The final component in the DO equation deals with the benthic
oxygen demand resulting from sludge deposits on the bottom of the
river. The model assumes that a pollution control program that reduces
BOD loads from other sources does not affect the level of benthic de-
mand. The load was 230,000 pounds in 1964, and it is assumed that
it will remain so indefinitely.'0° While this is obviously a simplification,
its speculative character is revealed by both the Thames Report and
students of the Delaware who have worked independently of DECS.
The English report reveals that sludge samples containing large num-
bers of a common worm ("tubificid" worms to be precise) exert an
oxygen demand ten times that of an identical sample without worms.1'0
At present, these worms exist in large numbers in the Delaware; they
are plentiful enough to support the activity of local entrepreneurs who
harvest the worms and sell some 600 gallons per day (272 million
worms) to tropical fish stores as feed.'0 5 It would appear likely, there-
fore, that a substantial portion of the benthic demand may ultimately
be traced to the oxygen requirements of the worms, which are one of the
organisms that can live at extremely low DO levels. As oxygen levels
increase as a result of the cleanup program, the number of worms may
be expected to multiply, thereby radically increasing the benthic demand
levels. As oxygen levels increase, the worms' natural predators may
102 Telephone conversation with R. A. Norris, Quirk, Lawler & Matusky, Con-
sulting Eng'rs., N.Y., N.Y., Aug. 1970; interview with N. Jaworski, Middle Atlantic
Region FWQA, in Annapolis, Md., Aug. 1970; interview with G. D. Pence, Jr.,
Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey Staff, in Edison, N.J., July 1970; Letter
from R. Thomann, Nov. 1971.
103 See note 40 supra.
104 THAm S REPORT, supra note 52, at 205-06.
105 G. Cox, The Role of Limnodrilu. spp. (Oligochaeta) With Regard to Sedi-
ment Degradation and Secondary Pollution in the Delaware Estuary 91 (unpublished
thesis, in Drexel University Library, Philadelphia).
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also multiply in the area, killing off some of the worms and creating a
new ecological equilibrium at which benthic demand will assume some
new value, but even this is speculative.' Thus, the model's simplistic
assumption that the benthic load will remain immutable is suspect.
We are especially concerned that neither the DECS nor the DRBC
has ever seriously considered the question despite the possibility that
the worms will multiply exponentially to the detriment of the oxygen
sag.
0 7
There is reason to believe that the DECS's failure to confront the
worm problem not only has led to a faulty prediction as to the Delaware
of the future, but has also permitted a misestimate of benthic demand in
the river of today. Research by one of Professor Zemaitas' doctoral
students, Dr. Geraldine Cox, indicates that the DECS staff measured
benthic demand in samples containing no live worms. 108 This means
that the 230,000 pounds of oxygen demand attributed to benthic de-
mand by the federal study could be a serious underestimate of present
conditions. The problem is made even more complex by the fact that,
according to Dr. Cox, the worms are not distributed evenly throughout
the river bed,'0 9 making a sophisticated biological survey a necessity if
one is to have an accurate view of the problem." 0
106 Dr. Russell, of Resources for the Future, reports to us that an ecologist
serving on the RFF staff, when questioned concerning the problem posed in the text,
responded that, "If one is talking about increases in DO from near zero to, say,
2 or 3 ppm, it may be that the worm population would increase substantially. If, on
the other hand, the expected increases are from 2 or 3 ppm to something higher,
it is very likely that the growth of a predator population will result in a significant
decrease in the worm population." Letter to the authors, Aug. 1971. We do not,
of course, suggest that this is anything more than a guess, made without the intensive
analysis that would justify even a modestly confident prediction. Nevertheless, the
guess does seem to suggest the merit of further consideration, since-as we have
suggested-it is far from clear whether DO will be higher or lower than 3 ppm
after the present pollution program is effectuated.
107 Professor Zemaitas of Drexel University believes this likely. Personal com-
munications with Dr. Zemaitas, in Philadelphia, Pa., Aug. 1970, Sept. 1970, and
Mar. 1971.
108 Cox, supra note 105, at 70.
109 Id. 70. This would help explain the fact that in the DECS samples the worms
were not even considered a problem. Indeed, it is claimed that they were not present.
Interview with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Survey Staff,
Dec. 1970. In his written comments on an earlier draft of this study, Professor
Thomann, disagreeing with his DECS colleague, G. D. Pence, Jr., recollects that
sludge worms were present in some of the sludge samples collected. Letter to the
authors from G. Pence, Jr., Nov. 1971. It is not clear from Professor Thomann's
commentary whether these worms were dead or alive when the oxygen demand of the
samples was ascertained. However this may be, it remains clear that the DECS did
not investigate the problem seriously.
110 In a memorandum to the Industrial Subcommittee of the DECS, one of the
attachments summarizing a presentation delivered to the group by Dr. Thomann
reported that the oxygen uptake rates of bottom material on the Delaware Estuary
measured by the DECS were about half those reported in the literature. Memorandum
from L. Falk, DECS, Technical Advisory Committee, Industrial Representative to
U.S. Public -Iealth Service, DECS, Technical Advisory Committee, Industrial Sub-
committee, Sept. 30, 1965, at Exhibit B (minutes of Technical Advisory Committee
meeting for Sept. 8, 1965).
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VI. APPRAISING THE UTILITY OF THE MODEL
We have attempted in the preceding pages to give the reader a
lively sense of the complex reality with which the model builders had
to deal in their ambitious attempt to understand the Delaware and the
many compromises they were obliged to make to complete their
job within a reasonable amount of time. Our discussion of the limita-
tions of DECS methodology and data should not be taken to deny the
great scientific value of the project. After all is said and done, a rela-
tively small staff at relatively low cost ($1.2 million) within a relatively
short time (four years from the beginning of actual study in 1962 to the
first public report in 1966) constructed a model that was an effort at
comprehensive understanding and has served as the basis of models
developed for such estuaries as the Hudson,"' the Potomac,1" 2 and the
San Joaquin." 3  Indeed, it is precisely the pathbreaking character of
the investigation that gives importance to our question: given the fact
that DECS represented the frontier of scientific research in 1966, to
what extent did it help or hinder the decisionmaker in defining policy?
Apart from indicating the sources of error in the model's construc-
tion and in its data base, we have taken special care to focus upon those
features that tended to lead the DECS to be either overly optimistic or
pessimistic in their assessment of the impact alternative cleanup pro-
grams will have upon the river's DO profile. Our discussion of the
DECS treatment of nitrogenous oxygen demand, raw sewage emitted
by storm sewers, and benthic oxygen demand leads us to conclude that,
in the aggregate," 4 the DECS analysis substantially underestimated
the difficulty of improving environmental quality in the so-called
"9critical region" of the estuary. Particularly troublesome is the fact
that, at least so far as benthic and nitrogenous demand is concerned,
the model's predictive powers will deteriorate with a substantial
change of the status quo. Thus, the degree to which the model success-
fully explains the present DO profile does not constitute an entirely
adequate indication of its utility to a policymaker who is principally
concerned with the degree to which the model will successfully predict
the future conditions that will result from the implementation of far-
reaching pollution control measures. Nevertheless, the model's ability
"'. Telephone Communication with R. A. Norris, Quirk, Lawler & Matusky,
Consulting Eng'rs, N.Y., N.Y., Aug. 1970.
112 L. HETLiNG, THE POTOMAC ESTUARY MATHEMATICAL MODEL (1968) ; Hetling,
Water Quality Models of the Estuary, sipra note 52; Interview with N. Jaworski,
Chesapeake Technical Support Laboratory, Middle Atlantic Region, FWQA, in
Annapolis, Md., July 1970.
113 U.S. PuBLIc HEALTH SERVICE, A WATER QUALITY MODEL OF THE SAN
JOAQUIN DELTA (1965).
114 For the countervailing factors, see note 92 supra.
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to describe present conditions provides some indication of its trust-
worthiness as to the future, and so we shall investigate this matter in
some detail.
DECS attempted to "verify" its model by comparing the actual DO
profiles observed on the Delaware each week during the summers of
1964 and 1966 with the DO profile the model predicted would occur
during these two summers." 5 At no point in the DECS 1966 Report,
however, was there any precise indication of the degree to which the
model's 1964 predictions were erroneous. 1 In our conversations with
both state and DRBC officials, though, there seemed a broad consensus
that the model's predictions had a "standard error" of .5 ppm.1 7  This
means that the predicted summer average DO in each of the thirty
sections would not diverge more than .5 ppm from the actual summer
DO in about two out of three summers."' On the basis of unpublished
information provided us by the DECS staff, we have calculated the
115 To calculate the average DO profile on the river during 1964 and 1966, the
DECS took weekly readings of the DO level prevailing in most of the river's 30
sections. It was then possible to derive a summer average for each section simply
by calculating the arithmetic mean of the weekly samples tested. Unfortunately, the
DECS definition of a summer changed between 1964 and 1966. In 1964, data col-
lected during the months of June, July, and August were used for the verification
analysis. In 1966, however, data collected during the months of July, August, and
September were used.
We do not know for certain why the DECS definition of a summer changed over
so short a time. However, as the following table shows, June 1966 was a relatively
rainy month, in which the flow of the Delaware was quite high:
Flow Rate at Trenton (cfs)
June July August September
1964 4437 3102 2472 2136
1966 6215 2554 2484 2726
WATER FsOURcEs DIvisioN, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SUR-
FACE WATER REcoRns OF NEw JERsEY 88 (1964); WATER REsOURcES DrvisIoN, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAl. SURVEY, WATER RESoURCES DATA FOR PENNSYL-
VANIA: PART 1. SURFACE WATER REcoRDs 47 (1966).
Given the DECS model's use of a steady state approach, if the DECS had tested
its predictions in 1966 for the same months (June-August) as in 1964, the dissimilarity
between the flow in June 1966 and that in July and August of 1966 would probably
have dramatically increased the error in the model's predictions. Thus the shift in
definition could conceivably have its source in a desire to put the model's reliability
in its best light.
116The clearest statement concerning verification to be found in the DECS
Report states that the comparisons between predicted and actual results "indicate
that the model can be used with a sufficient degree of accuracy." DECS, supra note
11, at 40 (emphasis added).
117 Interviews with state and DRBC officials who wish to remain anonymous.
118 The most common measure of error used by engineers to evaluate the validity
of this sort of model is the "root mean squared error," or "standard error." It is
defined as the square root of the sum of the squares of the differences between the
predicted and actual values divided by the number of differences. For example,
suppose we are examining a phenomenon that has successive average values of 1.0,
2.0, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0. If our model predicts successively 1.0, 1.5, 3.2, 5.0, and 6.5, the
differences are 0, -0.5, 0.2, 1.0, and 1.5. The squares of the differences are 0, 0.25,
0.04, 1.0, and 2.25. The sum of the squares of the differences is 3.54. And 3.54/5
is approximately 0.71. Thus, the square root of 0.71, or about 0.84, is the "root mean
squared error" for this example.
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error with somewhat greater precision. The data provided by DECS
indicates that during the summer of 1964, the staff took a weekly
measurement of DO concentrations at virtually every one of the
estuary's thirty sections. On the basis of these fifteen to twenty weekly
samples, it was possible to calculate an average DO concentration pre-
vailing during the summer at each of the thirty sections.' When we
compared the observed average with the predicted average, we found
that the model's predictions had a "standard error" 120 of .46 ppm. In
other words, if DECS predicted a DO level of 4.0 ppm in a section, the
observed DO was between 3.5 and 4.5 about two times out of three. A
graphic presentation of the data is given below.
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The model's error is of the same order of magnitude if one concentrates
exclusively upon the accuracy with which it predicted the summer
average prevailing in sections 12-19, which experience the most acute
oxygen shortage. Over these sections the model's standard error was
.43 ppm.
For these "critical" sections, however, this value appears to over-
state the model's accuracy. The key fact here is that it is physically
impossible for DO to go any lower than zero ppm. Imagine, for
example, that the model predicted a DO concentration of .5 ppm in
section 18 and that the summer average in that section was observed to
119 Personal Communication with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Compre-
hensive Survey Staff, in Edison, N.J., Aug. 1970.
120 For a definition of this term, see note 118 supra.
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be zero ppm. This does not imply that the error is only .5 ppm. For
it may be that the section is so overloaded with BOD that even if some
BOD is removed, the section will still register a zero DO level, despite
the model's prediction that section 18 "should" have a DO concentration
far greater than .5 ppm. Turning to the case at hand, a glance at the
1964 data indicates that the model has systematically overestimated the
DO concentrations prevailing in the "critical" sections, and that many
times, the DECS investigators observed a DO approaching zero in
these areas. Thus, the model's .43 ppm error could well understate the
extent to which its predictions diverge from reality.121
Up to the present point, we have assumed that the DO profile
predicted by the model in 1964 constitutes an appropriate starting
point for testing the accuracy of the model's predictions. This
assumption must be discarded once the procedure DECS used to
predict the 1964 DO profile is assessed. For the fact is that the
DECS staff distorted its verification procedure in a way that deprived
the "standard error" of .46 ppm of any significance to a decisionmaker
attempting to assess the model's reliability. Instead of testing the
model's predictions by comparing them with real world observations,
the DECS staff changed the model's original predictions so that they
would best conform to the observed DO data. When the DECS staff
first compared their 1964 predictions with the actual results observed
in 1964, before any "adjustments," they found a far greater disparity
between predicted and actual DO, whose precise dimension we cannot
report because the necessary data were not provided to us by the DECS
and are not available in the published literature. The substantial dis-
parity, however, did not convince the DECS that the basic structure of
the model was misconceived or in any way incomplete. Nor was any
attempt made to remeasure those independent parameters for which
measurement errors could have been substantial. r2 Rather, the DECS
concerned itself excusively with the possibility that the coefficients that
related the variables to each other had been mis-estimated. Indeed, the
concern was even narrower than this. As we have suggested,2 3 the
121 Moreover, even if .43 were the correct figure, it would only establish that
the average weekly deviation from the predicted summer average was .43 for that
summer. This is a long way from the claim that the model will err by only .43
ppm in its prediction of a summer average in 2 years out of 3. For example, if a
model predicts law school class attendance in 1964 to be 50 percent and actual average
weekly attendance is between 45 and 55 percent approximately two-thirds of the time,
it does not follow that this degree of accuracy will hold over the decade of the 1960's,
particularly when law school conditions change substantially.
122 Examples are storm sewer overflows, see text accompanying notes 73-81
supra; benthic demand, see text accompanying notes 103-10 supra; tributarial loadings,
see text accompanying notes 82-88 supra; and loadings from municipalities and
industries, see text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
123 See text accompanying notes 64-72 supra.
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coefficients used for the decay rate of nitrogenous oxygen demand
(SSUOD) and the reaeration rates were both plagued with substantial
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the DECS chose simply to determine
whether the model's accuracy would be improved if the reaeration
coefficients in the different sections were varied, ignoring SSUOD
decay entirely. 24
Moreover, the DECS engaged in this effort in a highly imprecise
way. If precision had been desired it would have been possible to
determine the degree to which the reaeration rate had actually varied
in the experiments that formed the basis for the DECS's original re-
aeration estimates. Then, DECS could have defined accurately the
range over which the reaeration coefficient could be plausibly permitted
to vary. Instead of undertaking this task, however, a large number of
computer runs were made in accordance with the staff's intuitive no-
tions as to the "reasonable" range of the coefficient involved in each of
the estuary's thirty sections. From this quantity of computer printout,
the staff chose the set of predictions that "best fit" the observations and
adopted the coefficients that were a consequence of this selection. 12 5
Once again, however, the selection of the "best fit" was completely in-
tuitive and without reference to standard statistical techniques.
These deficiencies in detail reflect an utter lack of sophistication in
statistical analysis. There is no justification for arbitrarily selecting
one of the large number of parameters-reaeration coefficient, SSUOD
decay rate, benthic demand, municipal and industrial discharges, tribu-
tarial load-all of which must have a significant error attached to their
measurement. For all one knows, the original reaeration coefficients
chosen were the best possible set, and the entire error could be best
explained by suitable variations in the other parameters. Indeed, it
will not do simply to fiddle with any or all of the variables or coefficients
in an effort to have the 1964 predictions closely fit the 1964 observa-
tions. There are countless combinations that would do this trick. A
change in one coefficient can be offset by an equivalent and opposite
change of another. To detect the correct relationship between all the
coefficients in each of the thirty sections by observing the river, it would
be necessary to have a very large number of observations that would
permit the use of standard statistical techniques to estimate each of the
coefficients with a tolerably small standard error. Even if this task
were accomplished the results obtained would be biased since there are
probably substantial errors in the measurement of independent variables
124 Personal communication with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Compre-
hensive Survey Staff, July 1970.
125 Interviews with G. D. Pence, Jr., E. Smith, and A. Morris, all members of
the DECS staff, June 1970; interview with G. D. Pence, Jr., Nov. 1970.
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that represent the numerous BOD inputs into the system. That the
DECS obtained a moderately close fit of the 1964 data by unscien-
tifically adjusting a single coefficient does not in any way suggest that
the model will predict with the same degree of accuracy DO levels
prevailing in another year with another flow rate and another set of
BOD loads.
In its second effort at "verification," the DECS staff attempted to
determine the degree to which its model could successfully predict the
DO profile in 1966.12 Unfortunately, DECS had not attempted to
conduct a systematic monitoring of BOD influents from point sources,
tributaries, and sludge in 1966. Consequently the staff had little choice
but to use their 1964 BOD inputs to predict the 1966 DO profile. This
introduced an error of unknown dimensions into the analysis: even if
the model had predicted the 1966 profile perfectly, one would not know
how to assess this feat unless one were certain that BOD loads had
remained constant. Even more important than this, the DECS staff
was unable to test the accuracy of the model along the dimension that
is most important to the policymaker. By using 1964 BOD loads,
DECS disabled itself from reporting how well the model could predict
DO under BOD conditions somewhat different from those in 1964.
Yet this is the question in which the administrator is most interested
since, after all, he wants the model to assist his decision on how much
he should force polluters to cut back on their BOD discharges. While
a model's ability to accurately predict the impact of small BOD changes
on one occasion does not necessarily mean that it will similarly predict
the impact of large changes in the DO profile resulting from an am-
bitious pollution control plan, it is at least a small step in the right
126 The DECS has never explained why it did not also use 1965 data to test the
model. It seems particularly important that this be done since one of the major
parameters in the model is the flow rate, and flows differed markedly in 1965 from
those that prevailed in either 1964 or 1966. In 1964, the average flow rate at Trenton
for July and August was 2787 cubic feet per second (cfs). WATER RESOURCES DIv.,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SURFACE WATER RECORDS OF
PENNSYLVANIA 41 (1964). In 1965, it was 1678 cfs. WATER RESOURCES Div., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA FOR PENNSYL-
vAniA: PART 1. SURFAcE WATER RECORDS 42 (1965). In 1966, however, average
flow was 2519 cfs, closely resembling 1964. WATER RESOURCES Div., U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER REsoURcES DATA FOR PENNSYLVANIA:
PART 1. SURFACE WATER RECORDS 47 (1966). Thus a proper "verification" run on
1964 and 1965 data would have been far more revealing than a verification for 1964
and 1966. Similarly, verification runs on the three years following 1966 would have
been illuminating since the average flow rates at Trenton for the months of July and
August were 7859 cfs in 1967, 5745 cfs in 1968, and 4821 cfs in 1969. (The 4821 cfs
given for 1969 is for the first 20 days of the period. After that, a deluge raised the
average flow rate for the entire period to 13,320 cfs.) WATER RESOURCES DIV., U.S.
DFP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA FOR PENNSYL-
VAN A: PART 1. SURFACE WATER RECORDs 47 (1967) ; WATER RESOURCES DIV., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA FOR NEW
JERSEY: PART 1. SURFACE WATER REcORDS 99 (1968); Water Resources Div., U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, Geological Survey (unpublished figures on file in Biddle Law
Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School).
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direction. The DECS use of 1964 BOD data in its 1966 "verification"
prevented it from making even this first small step. Moreover, other
river conditions prevailing during the summer of 1966 happened to
resemble quite closely those that had obtained in 1964,127 when the
equations were fiddled to obtain the "best possible" results. Thus, it
should prove no surprise that the typical error in the model's predictions
was only somewhat greater in 1966 than in 1964, with a "standard
error" 128 of .63 ppm when all sections are reported 12' and with a
smaller .47 ppm error when the comparison is limited to the model's
predictions of DO concentrations prevailing in the zone of maximum
oxygen depletion.
VII. ASSESSING TIHE DECS ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED
POLLUTION PROGRAMS
All this means that if the decisionmaker was to gain any sense of
the model's accuracy, it would have been necessary for him to move
beyond the DECS presentation and insist that the staff report the dis-
parity it found between actual and predicted DO profiles before it began
distorting its procedures to obtain the set of predictions that "best fit"
the observed data. Whatever the defects in the original coefficients (and
we have shown that they are substantial) at least they were not manipu-
lated for the purpose of putting the model in the best possible light.
Even if this disparity were known, however, it would not be of
much significance to the policymaker wishing to chart the future course
of pollution control on the Delaware. As we have seen, the model's
power to predict the consequences of adopting ambitious cutback plans
will be significantly worse than its ability to predict conditions like those
presently prevailing on the river. Thus, given the various kinds of
127 For flow rate comparisons, see note 126 supra. Temperature of the water at
Trenton during the 2 years follows:
Delaware River Water Temperature-Trenton
June July August September
1964 72 78 75 72
1966 73 79 77 70
WATER RE OTRCES Div., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER
QuALTYr RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 24 (1964); WATER RESOURCES Drv., U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES DATA FOR PENNSYLVANIA:
PART 2. WATER QUALITY REcoRms 27 (1966).
128 For a definition of the term "standard error," see note 118 supra.
129 The 1966 exercise is further compromised by the comparison of the model's
predictions to the actual facts in only the central portion of the estuary, between
sections 6 and 19. No attempt was made to determine the extent to which the
model could predict accurately the conditions prevailing between Trenton and Bur-
lington, and between Marcus Hook and the Delaware Bay. Since the 1964 verification
indicated that the model's error was greatest in sections 1 and 7 (between Trenton
and Burlington), graph following note 120 supra, it is likely that the error indicated in
the text is an understatement.
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error afflicting the model's predictions, it would not at all be surprising
that the DECS forecasts of the DO impact of pollution control pro-
grams in the "critical" sections could have a "standard error" that was
in excess of one ppm rather than the .46 ppm generated by the 1964
"verification" analysis. 3 ' The model's predictions not only contain a
substantial error, but there is reason to believe that its predictions will
consistently err toward an overly optimistic assessment of the impact
of the pollution control programs under consideration.'31 A reader
sensitive to these factors will look with new insight at the table, repro-
duced for a third time, which best capsulates the DECS analysis:
TABLE 3
Average DO
in Most
Polluted High estimate-low estimate
Program Region Cost of benefits
I 4.5 $460 million $355-$155 million
II 4.0 250 million 320- 135 million
III 3.0 120 million 310- 125 million
IV 2.5 80 million 280- 115 million
Instead of a set of predictions that nowhere indicate substantial uncer-
tainty as to whether a given program of BOD cutbacks will lead to a
given DO objective, would not the DECS effort have been far more
useful to decisionmakers if the staff had appended the following
caution to its presentation?
WARNING TO DECISIONMAKERS. When we report that Pro-
gram II will lead to an average DO of 4.0 ppm during the
summer in the "critical" sections of the river, we wish to em-
phasize that during periods of heavy rain, DO levels will be
far lower for substantial periods as a result of the discharge
of raw sewage from Philadelphia and Camden. It may well
be that forcing cities and firms to reduce their output of
FSUOD will not improve the DO profile as much as we ex-
pect because more SSUOD will then be exerted in the "criti-
cal" sectors; also, it may well be that the worms inhabiting the
river sludge will increase in population and consume much of
the oxygen that the BOD cutback program is intended to re-
store to the Delaware's waters; also, despite the fact we
botched our "verification" procedures, decisionmakers should
recognize that the model consistently predicts a higher DO
concentration for the critical sections than the observed data
13 0 We can only rest this claim on intuition, given the absence of data. For a
somewhat more precise, but far from adequate, manner of assessing the model's
reliability, see Appendix infra.
131 Text accompanying note 114 supra.
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indicate, thereby suggesting again that our predictions have
an overly optimistic bias.
Even if none of these tendencies toward overoptimism
materialize, you should know that we would not be surprised
if Program II, which promises a DO level of 4.0 ppm, will in
fact during most summers achieve an average DO concen-
tration of only 3.0 ppm or even less. On the other hand, it
may be 5.0 ppm or even more.
Even if the program "succeeds" in achieving its DO goal,
the result may simply be that the river will turn from a turbid
brown to an unattractive green, thanks to algae bloom. We
have not studied this.
Similar caveats are appropriate in considering our pre-
dictions concerning the DO consequences of the other pro-
grams.
For more caveats and qualifications, see our detailed
report.
When confronted with this precis, the reader is doubtless tempted
to conclude that the DECS exercise, when properly understood, con-
tributed nothing of value to a more precise understanding of the prob-
lems confronting the sensitive decisionmaker. But this would be a
mistake-for it is only as a result of our effort to trace the DECS
investigations that it has been possible to obtain a perspective upon
the probable consequences of the costly program of "pollution control"
which the DRBC has adopted. Our basic complaint does not go to
the wisdom of the effort at sustained understanding of river dynamics
but to the way in which the DECS staff chose to translate their insights
into language comprehensible to decisionmakers. After all, the
WARNING we have written could easily have been made clear by the
DECS in its 1966 Report.
Rather than describing the problems it had confronted, however,
the DECS instead chose to transmit its work product primarily in the
form of a set of quantitative predictions. Indeed, since the DECS
analysis was conspicuously devoid of efforts to caution decisionmakers
of the limitations of its predictions, it invited a decisionmaker to avoid
a confrontation with the unpleasant realization that even relatively
expensive programs could not be counted upon to ameliorate signif-
icantly, let alone cure, the environmental degradation characteristic of
the darkest corners of our urban civilization. The Report's manner of
presentation itself constituted an assurance to laymen that they should
be confident that the experts had found DO to be a convenient index
of "water quality" and that the experts had predicted that alternative
pollution control programs will raise the DO index in the "critical
[Vol.120:419
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reaches" from 1 to 2.5 or 3 or 4. Given this setting it is but a short
step for laymen involved in the political process to limit themselves to
haggling whether the pollution control goal "should be" 2.5 or 3 or 4,
never facing the more troubling issues that lie submerged below the
numerical facade: Is our society willing to make the enormous
expenditures required to revolutionize environmental conditions next to
the industrial plants on the Delaware River? If not, why are we willing
to spend a quarter of a billion dollars (or more) to take half measures
that may well not improve matters significantly? Even if the DO goal
is fulfilled, could more pressing environmental goals have been achieved
with more certainty elsewhere at much lower expenditures? Consider-
ing the immense number of demands for social justice properly advanced
by blacks and other deprived minorities, is it appropriate to divert sub-
stantial social resources to ameliorate marginally the admittedly un-
desirable conditions in the Delaware's "critical sections"?
While we have already intimated our own view on these ques-
tions, ' 2 which we intend to elaborate in a subsequent article under
preparation, we do not suggest that there is any one "correct answer" to
them. Our point here is simply that the style of the DECS's analysis
did not invite the policymaker to confront these fundamental questions
and that this failing is a matter of substantial concern. This failing
is particularly unfortunate since if the DECS had taken pains to artic-
ulate the factors that made the achievement of meaningful environ-
mental improvement uncertain, its analysis would have induced decision-
makers to explore the basic premises of pollution control policy in a far
more probing way than in fact was attempted on the Delaware.
In saying this, we do not, however, wish to overemphasize the
points we have made. Even though the DECS DO model did not raise
the basic questions involved in an effort to rid the Delaware of BOD,
these questions could have been raised at other stages in the decision-
making process: the DECS's own cost-benefit analysis could have forced
these issues to the surface; the complex political process could have
done so as well. And we shall, in our subsequent efforts, seek to ex-
plore the reasons why these processes failed to surface the issues of
critical importance. We have focused on the DO model only because
clear analysis requires the student to understand each dimension of the
policy problem with sophistication before attempting a higher synthesis
of all the factors at work, and because when a higher synthesis is
finally attempted, it seems to us that the style of the DECS effort
played a significant role in the ultimate policy outcome, under which
132 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 41-45, 73-81 supra.
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enormous sums of money will be committed to a program that will yield
meagre environmental returns.
VIII. BEYOND THE STEADY STATE: THE TIME VARYING MODEL
As we have suggested, the DECS decision to put first priority on
generating a set of "steady state" DO predictions made a good deal 
of
sense from the scientific perspective. Thomann's basic model was, 
after
all, untested on an estuary; thus, it was wisest to assess the model
by simplifying the real world as much as possible without so departing
from reality that the model's predictive powers could not be ascertained
at all. Since during the summer months river flow rates and tempera-
tures were relatively constant 133 it was desirable to use a "steady state"
approach to predict the summer average DO profile, as a first attempt 
to
test the reliability of the Thomann construction.
We have, however, demonstrated that especially in its treatment
of storm sewer run-off and the loadings imposed upon the river by 
the
Upper Delaware beyond Trenton, as well as the tributaries of the main
stem, "steady state" methodology served to conceal important 
policy
dimensions from the decisionmaker
13 Equally important, "steady
state" thinking proved inadequate when it was recognized 
that the
estuary's pollution problems were not completely restricted 
to the
summertime. Each spring, Atlantic Ocean shad swim through 
the
polluted estuary on their way to their spawning grounds in the 
upper
reaches of the Delaware; each fall, the shad swim back through 
the
estuary and out to the sea. During these migration periods, tempera-
ture and flow conditions on the estuary fluctuate dramatically. In 
the
beginning of April 1964 (when the shad began their move upstream) 
:35
the river's temperature was 49°F.
3 6 while the temperature in early
June 1964 (when the last of the shad left the estuary for the upstream
waters) 137 was 72'F.
13s Similarly, the flow at Trenton in April was
15,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) while by June it had fallen to between
4000-5000 cfs. 1 9 Analogous changes occur during the fall months
133 We have, however, already explained that the DECS encountered serious
problems even in finding an intra-summer steady state condition 
for such a simple
variable as flow rate. See note 125 supra.
134 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 73-88 supra.
135 Morris & Pence, supra note 25, at 5.
136 Pence, Jeglic & Thomann, supra note 39, at 392.
137 Morris & Pence, supra note 25, at 5.
138 Pence, jeglic & Thomann, supra note 39, at 392.
139 Id.
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when the shad return to the ocean. 40 When the survival of the shad
became an important issue in the political process defining the water
quality objectives for the Delaware, the model builders were invited to
define more precisely the degree to which adoption of each of the five
competing quality programs would protect the shad in their struggle
up and down stream.
In undertaking this task, it was apparent to the DECS that given
the wide variations in flow rate and temperature during the migration
periods it would be pointless to use a "steady state" approach. Instead,
the staff attempted to develop a "time varying" model that could take
into account the impact of changing conditions. In its basic conceptual
structure, this model is identical to the one we have already analyzed:
it deals with the lag in nitrogenous oxidation, FSUOD and SSUOD
decay rates, advective transport, reaeration and benthic demand in the
same way as did the "steady state" model.' 41 And all our criticisms of
that model's use of these basic concepts apply here with equal force. 4 2
Moreover, in moving to a "time varying" analysis, the DECS staff did
not desert its "steady state" thinking with regard to a fundamental
factor, and thereby further undermined the reliability of its conclusions.
While the model builders did vary temperature and flow conditions to
mirror typical patterns obtaining during the spring and fall migrations,
the shad studies failed to take into account the way in which the DO
profilie varied with the temporal variation in BOD loadings, assuming
instead that throughout the spring and fall all BOD inputs remained
constant at their average annual level. This assumption was especially
hazardous because the model attempted to describe transient conditions.
Most important, it is quite untenable to treat storm overflow and BOD
loadings from the Upper Delaware as if they were constant over time.
Furthermore, our interviews with polluters reveal that a substantial
number of them expect their secondary treatment plants to be less
effective in the colder months than in the summer.'43 All this was
ignored by the DECS in estimating the impact each cleanup level would
have upon the survival of shad. Instead, using the model with all these
140 In 1964, the flow rate at Trenton stayed fairly constant at about 2200 cfs
throughout the fall until late December. The temperature fell rapidly from 78°F. in
late August, to 63°F. in late September, to 60'F. in late October, to 50* in late
November. See Morris & Pence, supra note 25. Apparently river conditions for
shad survival are most critical in the spring months. Id.
141 Pence, Jeglic & Thomann, supra note 39, at 383-84.
14 2 See text accompanying notes 62-110 rupra.
143 The effectiveness of sewage treatment plants is heavily related to the rate of
biological activity of the microorganisms that consume BOD in the treatment facility
before the waste is discharged into the river. The rate of this activity drops sig-
nificantly as temperature decreases, thereby reducing the percentage of BOD removed
in the plant.
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defects, the staff provided the DRBC with a chart that attempted to
delineate the shad's prospects under alternative BOD cutback regimes:
TABLE 4 144
ESTIMATED TOTAL UPSTREAM SHAD PASSAGE
Program Minimum % Survival
1 in 10 yrs. 5 in 10 yrs. 24 in 25 yrs.
II 95 95 90
III 85 85 80
IV 65 60 20
We do not mean to flail a dead horse. We shall only say that we think
it remarkable that at no point in the DECS 1966 Report is there any
indication of the limited value of these predictions. 4
IX. BEYOND 1966: FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE DECS WORK
A. The Regional Failure to Follow Through
Our analysis of the pioneering DECS model should not be mis-
interpreted to mean that it is impossible in principle to construct a
mathematical model of the river that would be accurate enough to be of
great assistance to decisionmakers. While the model supporting the
DECS 1966 Report to the DRBC did not meet this test, much could
have been done since 1966 to improve the reliability of the model's pre-
dictions. Advances along several fronts were possible: first, improve-
ments in the model's structure could have been attempted; secondly, the
relevant coefficients (like those describing the reaeration rate and the
decay of SSUOD) could have been remeasured with greater sophistica-
tion; thirdly, the BOD loadings imposed by the diverse pollution sources
could have been constantly monitored to test the ability of the model to
relate changing BOD loadings to the resulting DO profile. In the
following pages, we consider the extent to which these and similar tasks
have been attempted, thereby providing a framework for a consideration
(in section X) of the last of the three questions set out early in the
essay: which forms of administrative structure facilitate the on-going
pursuit of scientific factfinding essential for sophisticated river man-
agement? 146
While the BOD monitoring program seems in some ways the most
prosaic of tasks, it is nevertheless critical to a sustained advance in the
144 DECS, .upra note 11, at 60.
145 Nor is there any such indication in a paper on this subject written by 2
DECS staff members. See Morris & Pence, supra note 25.
146 Text immediately preceding sections II & III supra.
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art of understanding rivers in quantative terms. It is only by main-
taining a reliable data base that innovations in the model can be tested
empirically. Unfortunately, this basic task has been poorly discharged
since 1966. Indeed, it is fair to say that the concerned agencies have
less satisfactory data on BOD loadings at the time of this writing
(February 1971) than the DECS possessed in 1966.
To understand the source of one of the principal data problems it
is necessary, once again, to take into account the customs of the sanitary
engineering profession. Engineers have been wont to measure the
BOD content of waste samples by determining the quantity of oxygen
the waste consumes at a standard temperature of 20'C. during a five-
day period. (This value is often written BOD5.) Since carbonaceous
oxygen demand is still exerted after the first five-day period a constant
is used that permits the engineer to "extrapolate" to FSUOD in a
highly imprecise way; 14 SSUOD is not even measured under tra-
ditional practice. As we have noted, DECS revolutionized measure-
ment practices, attempting to calculate FSUOD and SSUOD more
satisfactorily. DECS strongly recommended a continuation of its
sophisticated measurement techniques.14 Since 1965, however, the
main task of measurement has passed from the DECS to the DRBC,
which, in turn, negotiated contracts with the three states bordering the
estuary. We have inspected the data collected by the states with some
care,149 and it indicates unequivocally a relapse into the traditional
defective measurement procedures. Almost all of the data sent by the
states to the DRBC is expressed in terms of traditional BOD5 .
Even more remarkable is the manner in which the states collect
BOD samples from the dischargers. There are clear dangers when an
inspector arrives at a plant and merely takes a sample of the untreated
waste and the treated effluent at a single point in time. First, given
the extreme variability of the wasteloads, a one-shot "grab sample" is
not representative; secondly, the procedure permits polluters who are
dishonest to cheat quite easily if they have cause to expect the investi-
gator to arrive on the premises at a particular time; thirdly, since there
is a substantial error in the BOD test ... several samples should be
taken at the same time to allow an averaging of results. Instead of
147 See T. CAm', supra note 25, at 243.
148 DECS, supra note 11, at 83-85.
149 Members of the study group, working under Professor Ackerman's super-
vision, collected the state reports concerning industrial and municipal discharges
made available by the state authorities of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
The data, at present, are on deposit in the project's files in Professor Ackerman's
possession.
150 Personal communication with G. D. Pence, Jr., Delaware Estuary Compre-
hensive Survey Staff, in Edison, N.J., July 1970.
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relying on a single "grab sample," a more expensive "composite
sampling" technique is necessary if reliable wasteload estimates are to
be expected. Under the "composite" method, several samples are taken
hourly over a twenty-four hour period, and an average of the test re-
sults is used as a measure of BOD load.
Our inspection of the state reports makes it clear that all three
states rely principally upon grab samples. Moreover, when composite
samples are attempted, the manner of execution undermines one's con-
fidence in the results obtained. The twenty-four hour procedure is rela-
tively expensive since it requires an inspector to be at a single plant both
day and night. Our interviews with Pennsylvania staff personnel indi-
cate that in order to save their time and the State's money, the polluter
is called in advance and told to start collecting hourly samples; the
inspector arrives on the scene later, and leaves before the sampling is
completed.' 5' Obviously, this practice undermines the neutrality that a
state sampling program is intended to obtain. Equally extraordinary
is the Pennsylvania bureaucracy's acceptance of the demand made upon
them by several large industrial firms that require the inspector to call
the company before he arrives to take even a grab sample.' 52 We do
not know whether similar practices obtain in Delaware and New Jersey.
Sampling frequency presents another problem. At present both
New Jersey and Delaware sample major industrial and municipal plants
monthly; Pennsylvania samples major plants once every second month
at best. Since sampling is expensive, a trade-off must be made between
accuracy and cost: in judging whether the monitoring is too frequent,
the critical factor must be the variability in the results obtained. Our
inspection of the state reports indicates, unfortunately, that in both in-
dustry and municipal facilities the variability is significant: often
samples reveal a fifty percent variation from observation to observation.
Similar variances are revealed when samples from the same month of
consecutive years are compared. These variances should not be surpris-
ing, given the grab samples upon which they are based. What appears
to be a year to year variation may actually be a variation of waste con-
centration from hour to hour. Thus, the chaotic condition of the
reports may simply reflect the inspector's arriving at 9:00 a.m. on one
visit and, on another, at 5:00 p.m. Nevertheless, the record suggests
that a more frequent monitoring schedule would be required at least
for certain polluters before data of sufficient reliability could be gathered
to justify the confident use of even an improved mathematical model.
151 Interviews with state officials who prefer to remain anonymous, summer 1970.
1:52 Id.
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Finally, a substantial number of the reports show obvious incom-
petence. Often reports fail to indicate the rate at which effluent is pour-
ing through the outfall, noting only the phrase "meter broken" in the
few cases in which any explanation for the failure is vouchsafed at all.
This makes the report worthless, since it is impossible to determine a
plant's daily BOD load without knowing both the concentration and
the volume of effluent, and volume can only be determined if one knows
the flow rate. Similarly, a substantial number of the reports indicate
that daily volume has been "estimated" but do not describe the manner
of estimation. Even worse, reports sometimes indicate that the BOD
concentration of the treated effluent was found to be greater than the
BOD of the raw waste. The anomalous readings may be the result of
careless mislabeling of bottles or, on the other hand, it may be the
result of the grab sample practice if, at the time of sampling, the raw
waste entering the treatment plant exerted less BOD than the par-
tially treated, but initially more heavily polluted, wastes leaving the
plant. In any event, it is deplorable that, when the laboratory BOD
analysis is received, such data are placed in the file without any indica-
tion of their intrinsic implausibility or any attempt to rectify the ap-
parent mistake.
The DRBC staff is aware of these failings and has thus far unsuc-
cessfully tried to induce the state pollution control bureaucracies that
collect the BOD data to adopt more elaborate and expensive procedures.
When DRBC staff members meet with their state counterparts at regu-
lar meetings of the Water Quality Advisory Committee, frequent pleas
are made to supply data that will permit the accurate calculation of
FSUOD."5 ' Even here, however, we have found no indication that the
DRBC has put any substantial pressure on the states to provide data
on nitrogenous demand. This vacuum is significant now and will be-
come increasingly important over time. We have already noted that
the DECS model is deficient in its treatment of nitrogenous demand;
yet data is not being collected that could serve as the basis for reliable
theoretical work on the problem. Moreover, as traditional "secondary
treatment" facilities of the sort being constructed under the DRBC
cleanup primarily eliminate carbonaceous demand and only incidentally
remove nitrogenous, SSUOD's share of the total will increase dra-
matically after the anticipated cleanup. In short, the DRBC is not now
receiving the data on municipal and industrial treatment plants that
either permit it to have a sophisticated understanding of the Delaware of
153 DRBC Water Quality Advisory Comm., Minutes of meetings of Mar. 18,
1969, Oct. 2, 1969, and Apr. 16, 1970 (unpublished, available at Delaware Dep't of
Natural Resources & Environmental Control).
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today or enable it to make a more accurate prediction as to the impact
its program will have on the Delaware of the future.'54
Turning to the DRBC's efforts to measure other BOD inputs, the
results are similarly disappointing. No significant work has been at-
tempted on the measurement of benthic demand or upon the analysis of
BOD entering the estuary from the river's tributaries. In contrast, the
agency has been taking important steps to expand its scientific knowl-
edge of conditions prevailing in the relatively unpolluted waters of the
Delaware above Trenton. Members of the staff are presently collecting
data that will permit the application of a Thomann-type model to this
region, and the information gathered in this study should illuminate
the impact the Upper Delaware has upon the estuary below Trenton,
thereby improving the quality of the data used by the DECS model in
this single respect.
Just as the data collection effort has proceeded at a crawl, so too
has new theoretical work sponsored by the DRBC. No explorations
of reaeration rates have been attempted by the agency, despite the in-
adequacy of the DECS treatment and their importance to the model's
predictions. Nor has there been a significant effort to better understand
turbidity or the dynamics of benthic demand. On the other hand, a
substantial amount of theoretical work has been attempted to better
define the impact nitrogenous demand will have upon the estuary after
the anticipated cleanup has been attempted. It is difficult, however, to
determine the validity of such theoretical work without the assistance
of detailed data on nitrogenous loadings, which the DRBC has failed
to collect.
Given the failure of the agency to move substantially beyond the
DECS's work, it should not be surprising that little has been done to
determine the extent to which the DECS model successfully predicts the
DO profiles prevailing along the estuary since DECS's final "verifi-
cation" analysis of 1966. To run even a moderately satisfactory analy-
sis it would be necessary to obtain reliable data on BOD loadings that
are more recent than those DECS obtained in 1964. Since this essential
work has not been attempted, meaningful verification efforts are impos-
sible. Thus, while members of the DRBC staff attempted a "verifica-
tion analysis" on the basis of fragmentary 1968 BOD data, 55 we have
154This is particularly unfortunate since river conditions during these years
differed substantially from those prevailing in 1964 and 1966, see note 126 supra;
thus a "verification" run on newer data would have provided extremely revealing
information regarding the model's utility.
155 MacEwen & Tortoriello, Forecasting of Water Quality Data in the Delaware
River Estuary, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON DATA AND INSTRU-
MENTATION FOR WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 99 (J. KERRIGAN ed. 1970).
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reason to believe that the DRBC staff itself considers this endeavor to
be of no real significance." 6
B. The Federal Failure to Follow Through
At the time it published its "preliminary report" for use by the
DRBC in the summer of 1966, the DECS promised a much more de-
tailed and definitive "final" document by the end of 1967. At the time
of this writing (February 1971), however, this report has not yet been
published. While a number of the final report's chapters have been
circulated informally, it does not appear that significant progress is now
being made that would ensure the publication of a complete report
within the foreseeable future. Even if the document should ultimately
see the light of day, its utility will be limited since the DECS staff
apparently has not integrated post-1966 data into its work, 57 for the
simple reason that adequate data do not exist.
Indeed, at present the DECS staff has basically ceased to function
as a unit. Only three of its members remain with the regional office of
the Federal Water Quality Administration at Edison, New Jersey, and
they are devoting only a small fraction of their time to the Delaware,
working instead upon projects the FWQA considers to be of greater
immediate importance.
X. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND THE PURSUIT OF SCIENCE
In sum, we have presented an understandable, yet depressing, tale.
An admirable scientific endeavor in river dynamics was transformed by
the force of events into a decisionmaking tool before it was sufficiently
developed. After the short-term pollution control decisions had been
made the scientific enterprise lost its vitality. Decisionmakers charting
the course of the Delaware five or ten years from now will be constrained
once again to activate a crash research program, which, with inadequate
data and analysis, will nonetheless crank out predictions of limited value
to the decisionmaking process. Moreover, policymakers and scientists
on other rivers will not be able to use the Delaware's experience for
their own profit.
While this dismal cycle may in part be attributed to the innate
shortsightedness of mankind, an explanation that relies exclusively upon
individual human frailties is incomplete. In large part the scientific
156 Personal communication with an anonymous member of the DRBC staff, Oct.
1970.
'57 If the full report had been published in 1967, as scheduled, others might have
been able to proceed with further research on the basis of the DECS pioneering work.
Instead, other workers in the field have been deprived of a good data base, and the
original DECS workers have been deprived of full recognition for their contributions
to an understanding of estuarine pollution.
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failure was a foreseeable result of the type of administrative structure
that prevailed along the Delaware during the 1960's. The source of
the problem rests with the institutional division of responsibility between
the DECS, a creature of the federal agency charged with water pollution
control, and the DRBC, a regional agency formed by the concerned
states and the federal government. To divide the "thinkers" (DECS)
from the "doers" (DRBC) in this way is to ask for several kinds of
trouble. The "thinking agency" has little incentive to stay with the
problem over the long haul. Instead, it may well maximize its bureau-
cratic prestige by publishing a preliminary report which loudly claims
to be "relevant" to the decisionmakers' problems, prematurely leaving
the area in search of new problems that are capable of "innovative"
solutions. A pure "thinking" agency may be expected not only to plan
episodically, but also to justify its existence by overselling the accuracy
and importance of its preliminary reports by underemphasizing the un-
certainties underlying its predictions.
In overselling its innovative enterprises, the thinking agency is
aided by the action agency for several reasons. First, the action agency
does not possess large numbers of personnel equipped with the necessary
analytical skills to both understand the model and take steps to improve
the model's structure and data base. Since agency funds are always
limited, there is a natural tendency for the available money to be allo-
cated for uses the existing action officials understand, to the prejudice
of those they do not. Secondly, the action agency, after it adopts
one of the competing pollution programs delineated by the thinkers, will
have a natural tendency to seek to prove that the plan it has selected is
the one the thinkers' report supports most persuasively. In short,
even if the report in fact played a relatively unimportant role in the
minds of the decisionmakers, the action agency will seek to legitimate
its decision by proclaiming that it is rooted in the expert analysis pro-
vided by the thinkers, who have themselves sought to proclaim its im-
portance for the reasons outlined above. 5 After this public episode in
3
58 A tendency evident in the DRBC experience.
The DECS study played an important role in official statements legitimating the
DRBC's decision:
A U.S. Public Health Service Report issued in 1966 found the river's
overburdened estuary-the 86 mile stretch from below Wilmington to Trenton
-to be "a polluted waterway which depresses esthetic values, reduces recrea-
tional, sport and commercial fishing, and inhibits municipal and industrial
water use."
This important if uncomplimentary document, probably more than any-
thing, represented the turning point for the polluted, oxygen-shy lower Dela-
ware. Its findings of degraded conditions and extensive options for improving
them (and surprisingly even for not improving them) startled the three-state
area and spurred it into a solemn cleanup commitment.
7 DRBC ANN. REp. 6 (1969) (emphasis added). See also 5 DRBC ANN. REP.
6-8 (1967).
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which the action agency seeks to legitimate its decision by relying upon
the model-builders' expertise, efforts to launch a systematic effort to
move beyond (or even update) the DECS model become something of
an embarrassment. If it is necessary to improve the DECS model,
does not this suggest that something was seriously wrong with the
original analysis already publicly proclaimed to legitimate the original
decision? Thirdly, after the basic pollution control program has been
selected, the action agency's bureaucracy can be expected to concentrate
its energies on enforcing the decision rather than engaging in the more
basic research that will ultimately be needed for future planning efforts
on the Delaware and elsewhere. After all, the action agency has yet to
make its bureaucratic reputation, and, over the short term, rewards will
be governed by successfully implementing the program already adopted
rather than conducting experiments and collecting the data necessary
for future planning along the estuary.
All this, of course, does not mean that an action agency is not
correct in placing first priority upon implementing the pollution control
program selected by decisionmakers. We simply argue that powerful
bureaucratic forces will induce such an agency to ignore the necessity
of following through upon the planning work initiated by others. In
contrast, if both thought and action had originally been within the
province of a single agency, the chances of an effective follow through
on the research effort would have been improved somewhat. While the
agency would have had the same tendency toward public self-praise of
its planning sophistication in an attempt to legitimate its ultimate de-
cision, the public praise would in this case probably strengthen the hand
of the planning part of the agency in its efforts to maintain its share of
agency funds for the further support of the scientific effort. Similarly,
since the model-builders would already be well entrenched within the
agency bureaucracy, they could be expected to sufficiently appreciate the
informal patterns of power prevailing within the administrative struc-
ture to make their influence felt.
Having discerned the significance of the division of responsibility
between DECS and DRBC, it is necessary to inquire more deeply into
the reasons that brought separation about. From the legal viewpoint,
nothing was foreordained about the division of the planning and deci-
sionmaking roles. The DRBC's charter provides ample authority for
sponsoring planning efforts of this magnitude.'59 As we have seen, the
development of an institutionally separate DECS effort had much to do
with two accidents of history: the interest of the Public Health Service
in novel forms of cost-benefit analysis; the infant DRBC's concern with
159 Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 13 (1961).
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the pressing issues emerging from the deepening drought along the
river.160 Nevertheless, the same institutional bifurcation might have
resulted even if the DRBC had not been diverted by the water shortage
away from pollution control research. For the administrative pattern
revealed along the Delaware is a fundamental aspect of the "coopera-
tive" federalism, which, in increasingly complex forms, is playing a
central role within the contemporary polity: a federal "task force" pro-
viding "technical" assistance to local "decisionmakers," who "imple-
ment" decisions with substantial federal oversight.'' And it is doubtful
that the DRBC could have transcended this pattern. The agency, after
all, had no legal authority to veto the federal study, nor to require that
its own personnel undertake the work; 162 nor would it have made sense
to institute a parallel effort of its own that would only replicate much
of the same ground at additional cost. It was only if the federal
authorities had delegated the project to the regional body that the
bifurcation could have been avoided. But this result was most unlikely:
first, the Public Health Service would have been reluctant to abandon a
project likely to redound to its bureaucratic prestige; secondly, given
the prevailing philosophy of "cooperative federalism," which legitimates
federal "technical" assistance, it is most unlikely that anyone within the
federal bureaucracy would have thought it incongruous for a federal
task force to investigate a regional problem in lieu of the regional agency
established for the purpose.
Nonetheless, this structural division was of substantial significance
for the future of regional government along the Delaware. A regional
authority must develop its staff's planning capacities if it is to become
anything more than a loose confederation in which representatives of
the federal and state bureaucracies compromise their differences with-
out any substantial effort to view the Delaware River's problems from
a regional perspective. And the failure to develop planning resources
feeds upon itself: it was in large part because the DRBC was not
-60 See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
161 A systematic legally-oriented analysis of the premises underlying the numerous
patterns along which federal-state relationships have been structured has yet to be
written, although the importance of the problem has been perceived by political scien-
tists, AREA AND POWER (A. Maass ed. 1959), historians, D. ELAZAR, THE AmERIcAN
PARTNERSHIP (1962) ; Elazar, Federal-State Collaboration in the Nineteenth Century
United States, 79 Poi. Scr. 248 (1964), economists, G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1967) ; ESSAYS IN FIScAL FEDERALISm
(R. Musgrave ed. 1955), as well as legal academics, F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW,
MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 970-1212 (1970).
162 Indeed, § 1.5 of the Compact reads:
It is the purpose of the signatory parties to preserve and utilize the functions,
powers and duties of existing offices and agencies of government to the extent
not inconsistent with this compact, and the commission is authorized and
directed to utilize and employ such offices and agencies for the purpose of
this compact to the fullest extent it finds feasible and advantageous.
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obliged to undertake a DECS-type study with its own personnel that
it was poorly equipped to follow through on the task when the federal
innovators left the scene.
Since the regional agency lacked an active research component, it
was only natural that the essential task of data collection was delegated
to the respective states, whose agencies have responded in such an
unsatisfactory manner. Once again, it is too easy to explain the states'
poor data collection practices by invoking the well-worn notion that
state bureaucrats are more incompetent than their counterparts at other
levels of government. However this may be, a more compelling ex-
planation exists for the case at hand. Since the states' officials are
not responsible for maintaining the model's accuracy, they have little
incentive to collect data useful to run the model, if that effort requires
them to change their cheap and easy grab-sampling technique for BOD5 .
In short, one of the important reasons that the data is not being col-
lected properly is that the states are responsible for data collection while
the DRBC is responsible for data manipulation. Since state officials
are not dependent upon the DRBC staff for their promotion or job
security, DRBC personnel have no sanction to impose when the
relevant data do not arrive. Moreover, since the DRBC staff does not
even work in close geographic proximity with most of their state
counterparts, even informal sanctions are relatively ineffective. 63 The
DRBC staff's primary recourse is an occasional plea for better data at
the regular meetings of DRBC personnel with their state counterparts.
The relationships between federal, regional, and state authorities
we have charted should serve as a caution that the vague notion of
"cooperative federalism" is in need of much more precise analysis than
it has yet been given. At least in decisions requiring a significant
scientific input of a continuing nature, it will not suffice to place bits
and pieces of the scientific enterprise in different bureaucratic structures
at different levels of government. The course of events along the
Delaware eloquently warns the Social Engineer against placing the
federal "thinkers" in one bureaucratic box, then shifting the responsi-
bility for scientific follow through to the regional "decisionmaking"
agency, simultaneously consigning the task of "data gathering" to yet
another set of state agencies. In such a structure each component is
prone to lose sight of the function it should be performing to enhance
the rationality of the pollution control scheme that ultimately is the
product of all the sound and fury.
263 The Commission's staff works in Trenton, New Jersey, close to their New
Jersey counterparts, but far from Albany, Harrisburg, and Dover.
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The values of decentralized authority implicit in "cooperative
federalism" would be better served by a more discriminating analysis.
Given the continuing nature of the enterprise, the task of understanding
the state of the river should be unambiguously assigned to a single
agency for the long haul. Moreover, the Social Engineer should be
reluctant to assign this task to an entity divorced from final decision-
making responsibility, unless special steps are taken to assure that the
"thinking" agency is committed to the project for the long haul. Thus,
if there were a way to commit agency funds for a specific project over
a twenty year period or if the research project was contracted out to a
private firm for a similar term, the problems arising from an insti-
tutionalized bifurcation between thought and action might be controlled
reasonably well. If, however, explicit steps to deal with the problem
are not taken, the Delaware's experience suggests the wisdom of assign-
ing the fact-finding function to the agency charged with ultimate deci-
sionmaking authority over the river's future. Doubtless, there are
substantial disadvantages implied by this joinder of functions, -but at
least there is some assurance-for the reasons previously suggested-
that sophisticated research and planning will not be condemned to the
episodic existence it has led on the Delaware River. Unfortunately, our
case study does not permit us to explore the important questions going
to the way an agency which embraced both decisionmaking and fact-
finding functions should be structured to ensure an ongoing research
effort. Our study can only serve as a warning to the Engineer that he
refrain from repeating past errors in the future.
To make matters worse, it is not at all clear to us that these warn-
ings will be heeded in the world of American institutions. A regional
agency like the DRBC enters a world already occupied by well estab-
lished institutions on the state and federal levels, which are unlikely to
surrender meekly even so humdrum an activity as data collection.
Except in the unlikely event that the regional compact grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the regional agency in such matters, the effective pursuit
of science will be sacrificed because established institutions refuse to
defer to the new agency. Unless there is a greater sensitivity, especially
on the part of the federal officials, to the need to foster the development
of research activities in infant regional structures, "cooperative fed-
eralism" will be no more than a slogan concealing ineffective and
sporadic scientific research. Indeed, if the outlook for successfully
transferring the factfinding function to the regional agency is poor, it
may well be wisest to consider the desirability of transferring the
decisionmaking function to the federal level. It would then be possible
to coordinate research and decisionmaking within a single agency
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structure. Of course, the effective pursuit of science is not the only
consideration in passing judgment upon the ultimate desirability of
federal, as opposed to regional, decisionmaking control. Nevertheless,
it should not be ignored in the inevitably complex task of constructing
the optimal governmental structure for the control of water pollution.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
We have had four major purposes in writing this essay. The first
is severely practical: studies similar to the DECS are being pursued
around the country and if lawyers and other policymakers are to under-
stand their significance and validity, they must learn the questions they
should ask of the experts. Up to the present time, the basic concepts
involved in model building have been presented in a mathematical lan-
guage forbidding to most law trained professionals; this essay attempts
to bridge the gap. A policymaker, attempting to evaluate a DECS-type
study, should not blithely assume that it shares the same frailties as the
models we have analyzed. Nevertheless, at least he will have a starting
point for an intelligent scrutiny of the numbers placed before him.
Secondly, just as law reviews have traditionally criticized the rationality
of judicial opinions, we have attempted to perform a similar function
for a less familiar aspect of the administrative process. If anything,
criticism here is even more important, given the failure of DECS and
DRBC staff members to document their analyses fully. If this essay
prompts a rejoinder that reveals more of the inner workings of the
DRBC and DECS scientific effort, its value will have been fully
vindicated. Thirdly, an understanding of the frailties of DO as a
policy indicator and the uncertainty concealed by the DECS DO pre-
dictions will provide an important perspective from which to evaluate
the Political and Technocratic Models on the Delaware. Was the
political process organized in a way that would surface the basic policy
issues concealed by the proffer of DO as a criterion of water quality?
Would the politicians accept the DECS definition of the policy options
without recognizing the chance that the program selected would not
accomplish its goal? If uncertainty was recognized, what were the
implications drawn? Analogous questions should be asked of the Tech-
nocratic effort to quantify costs and benefits. Finally, if neither Techno-
crat nor Politician responded to these questions in a satisfactory way,
we shall be obliged to investigate the sources of their failure, and in
doing so better understand the questions of basic policy and institutional
design that must be confronted before an industrial civilization can
come to terms with the environmental consequences of its continued
existence.
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Fourthly, this essay is intended as an invitation to the legal pro-
fession to liberate itself from the conventional categories already afflict-
ing the infant study of "environmental law." Despite the fact that
lawyers (and law school professors) pride themselves in being "gen-
eralists" open to the peculiarities of new problems, the truth is that, like
all human kind, the profession tends to convert new problems into
familiar concepts. Thus "environmental law" turns out to be an
occasion for canvassing once again some basic questions in adminis-
trative law, the traditional law of torts, and the received wisdom
concerning water rights. The rapidly expanding literature seems full
of discussions of the law of standing, "substantial evidence," and
occasionally the more general questions concerning the extent to which
courts should defer to administrative expertise in the formulation of
environmental policy. Similarly, we are inundated with discussions of
the law of nuisance and riparian rights.
All this is fine; but it suffers from the important defect that it
myopically concentrates upon the law as it is applied by courts. If the
legal community contents itself with such analyses, it will remain at the
periphery of policymaking since policy in most areas will be made and
enforced primarily by administrative agencies. In the case before us,
for example, it should be clear that no court could handle the scientific
enterprise even half as well as the DECS and the DRBC have done:
courts are even less capable of assuring sustained and long term
scientific effort than even the disorganized administrative process we
have described. Thus if lawyers are to understand the genesis of
pollution control policy, they must begin to understand the alternative
ways the administrative process may be structured to find the "facts ;"
how the "facts" condition the policy options perceived to be open; how
the decisionmaker must go beyond the numbers to probe the reliability
of the experts' predictions.
The terrain is unfamiliar, but the tale presented here suggests that
the sophisticated legal professional has a significant contribution to
make in each of the three areas we have considered. First, consider
whether it is wise to expect that the typical engineer will, on his own
initiative, raise the first of our three questions ' and inquire into the
extent to which his work on the DO profile improperly diverts public
attention from more pressing environmental concerns. For once this
question is raised seriously, the answer may be far too threatening to
the engineer's self-esteem. What if he concluded that an ecological
study of the Delaware Bay was far- more important than an effort to
chart the DO profile of the polluted estuary? Would that not suggest
164 Text immediately preceding sections II & III supra.
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that he and other engineers must take a back seat to other professionals?
In contrast, the legally trained policymaker can regard with equanimity
the rise and decline of various species of expertise-he has no vested
interest in any of them (except his own). It is precisely the goal of
legal training to force the lawyer to assess the policy implications of
the "expert information" all too eagerly proffered as a "valuable input"
into the "decisionmaking process."
Similarly, it is utopian to expect that an engineering team will
take great pains to reveal all of the uncertainties threatening the accu-
racy of the DO predictions generated by a model they have spent years
building, and thus raise the second major issue that has occupied our
attention.'65 It is not merely that all human beings wish to emphasize
the affirmative aspects of their achievements; even more important is
the manner in which the DECS Report understands the very idea of
"achievement." The DECS "succeeded" insofar as it developed a set
of equations defining a system that will achieve a predetermined
purpose. Thus, in emphasizing its "achievement," the research staff
emphasized the accuracy of the numbers its model generated. In
contrast, the lawyer is predisposed by his education to doubt that any
simple structure can adequately "explain" an important piece of reality.
Indeed, from his first day in professional school, the lawyer is taught
that to be "successful," he must worry about contingencies laymen are
apt too readily to discount, and thereby "complicate needlessly" situa-
tions that seem "simple" to others. It is the lawyer's delight in con-
tingency, complexity, and ultimate scepticism that predisposes him to
ask basic questions as to the model's reliability that the engineer would
otherwise insufficiently emphasize in presenting his "success." Finally,
there is even less reason to believe that the engineering profession will,
on its own initiative, raise our third question and consider the structures
that will facilitate the effective pursuit of science. Thus if lawyers and
legal scholars ignore these issues and preoccupy themselves exclusively
with judicial questions, it is likely that these issues will remain slighted
by those professionals most intimately involved in the factfinding
process, to the substantial prejudice of the ultimate environmental
policies our institutions select. There is, alas, a substantial difference
between Engineering and Social Engineering, and the legal community
can make a substantial contribution to the development of the latter
science.
105 Text immediately preceding sections II & III supra.
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APPENDIX
Model Formulation
The DECS mathematical model is based on a materials balance
analysis of a hypothetical segment of the river. Repeating the same
analysis for a large number of sections of the river results in a set of
simultaneous differential equations.'
Since the concentration of DO is directly related to BOD, it is
necessary to model, for each section of the river, both DO concentration
and BOD concentration. Thus there are twice as many differential
equations as there are sections. In the DECS model of the Delaware
River 30 sections were used, requiring 60 differential equations. In
writing the differential equations, it is necessary to include all "sources"
and "sinks" (i.e., withdrawals) of BOD and DO. For example, BOD
and DO "sources" and "sinks" in section i of the river are as follows:
Sources of BOD to Section i
1. Current flowing downstream
(and upstream, since we are
dealing with an estuary).
2. A contiguous section having a
higher BOD concentration.
3. Municipal and industrial sew-
age outfalls in the section (in-
cluding material from combined
storm sewers).
4. Suspended solids resulting from
either scouring action of the
river bottom by high flows,
stirring up of worms living in
the sludge, or Corps of Engi-
neers dredging activity. (Not
included in DECS model.)
5. Tributaries.
Sinks of BOD from Section i
1. Current flowing downstream
(and upstream, since we are
dealing with an estuary).
2. A contiguous section having a
lower BOD concentration.
3. Consumption by microorgan-
isms.
I This technique is solidly rooted in the general theory of transport phenomena.
For a clear presentation of a number of applications of the method see R. FRANKs,
MATHEMATICAL MODELING IN CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 228-58 (1967).
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Sources of DO to Section i
1. Current flowing downstream
(and upstream).
2. A contiguous section having a
higher DO concentration.
3. Reaeration (this is the major
source of DO to the section).
4. Photosynthetic activity in the
river. (Not included in DECS
model.)
5. Tributaries and plant outfalls.
Sinks of DO from Section i
1. Current flowing downstream
(and upstream).
2. A contiguous section having a
lower DO concentration.
3. Consumption by microorgan-
isms in consuming BOD.
4. Consumption by benthic de-
mand.
5. Consumption by chemical oxy-
gen demand.
6. Industrial water intake streams.
(Not included in DECS model.)
From the enumeration above, the equations for section i are as follows: .
(1) For BOD:
dL1V,--=Qi-1'i [el-1, i LI-1 + (1 - el-i., i) LJ]
dt
_- Q, i+1 [el, i+1 Li + (1 - el, 1+i) L1+1 ]
+ E,- 1 , (L,- 1 - LI) + El, 1+1 (L,+1 - L) - dL 1V 1+f 1
(2) For DO:
dc,
V,-= Q1_1, I [e 1-3i c1-1 + (1I e1-i , ) c1]
dt
_- Q,. i+ [el, +1 c, + (1 - e +1) ci+i]
+ E,- 1 . (cr-i -c) + El, i+1 (cl+i - c1 ) + Vir (c - c1)
- dL iV1 + P1.
Where:
Vi represents volume, liters,
Q represents net flow, liters/day,
L, represents BOD level in the section, mg./liter,
e represents tidal mixing parameter, dimensionless,
E represents eddy exchange coefficient, liters/day,
d, represents decay rate, day-',
f, represents BOD discharged to the section, mg./day,
2 Thomann, Mathematical Model for Dissolved Oxygen, 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AmERICA" SOCIETy OF CIVIn ENGINEERS, SANITARY ENGINEERING DmSiON 1, 9
(1963).
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cl represents dissolved oxygen level in the section, mg./liter,
ri represents reaeration rate, day',
c represents saturation level of DO, mg./ liter,
P represents other sources or sinks of DO action on the
section, mg./day.
Explanation of Terms
1. The terms
Qj-1, i [el-1, 1 LI-1 +- (1 - e,-i, ) Lj]
Qi, i+1 [el, 1+1 L, + (1 - el, i+1) L1+1]
and the corresponding terms in the DO equation, deal with the rate at
which material (item 1 in the sources and sinks tables above) enters and
leaves the section because of net advective flow into or out of the section.
This is termed advective transfer and e is termed the advective co-
efficient. The advective coefficient is merely a proportionality constant
used to express the effective concentration at the boundary between the
sections.
3
2. The terms
Ei-1 , i (L 1- - L1) + E, j+1 (L 1+1 - LI)
and the corresponding terms in the DO equation, deal with the rate at
which material (item 2 in the sources and sinks tables above) enters
and leaves the section because of diffusion between sections, i.e., they
represent material transported between sections due to the driving force
of concentration differences.
3. The term
dIL,VI
which occurs in both the BOD and DO equations represents the rate at
which BOD leaves the section by oxidation, i.e., by aerobic biochemical
reaction. It occurs in both the equations because the rate at which
BOD is consumed must equal (by definition) the rate at which oxygen
is consumed during the oxidation of the BOD.
4. The term fi represents the rate at which BOD enters the section
from external sources.
5. The term Pi represents other sources and sinks of DO acting on the
section. These are two types, the first being benthic oxygen demand
and the second being chemical oxygen demand.
3 For a detailed discussion of this, see R. BuNcE & L. HErLING, A STEADY STATE
SEGMENTED ESTUARY MODEL (Federal Water Pollution Control Administration Tech-
nical Paper No. 11, 1967).
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6. The term Viri (c?-c) represents the rate at which DO enters the
section by reaeration.
dL dc,
7. The terms V, - and V - represent, respectively, the rate of
dt dt
change in the amount of BOD in section i and the rate of change in the
amount of DO in section i.
Steady State and Time Varying Models
While the equations are linear in the independent variables, some
of the coefficients vary with time (or with temperature, which in turn
varies with time). It is possible to work with the equations by either
(a) simplifying them in some way, or (b) utilizing a simulation tech-
nique to make their solution feasible. Both of these techniques were
used. In the first case a steady state solution was sought for the
summer months when DO values were at their annual average low.
In the second case simulation allowed calculation of BOD and DO
response on a year round basis.
The Problems Resulting From Small Errors in the Parameters
Consider a highly simplified situation for purposes of illustrating
the difficulties involved. Suppose we consider a section i that has the
same level of DO and BOD as sections i - 1 and i + 1. Moreover,
suppose that el-, 1 and el, j+1 are equal, that the flow rate Qj-i, I
Q +, i and E1, i-1 = E 1+3., j. Moreover, assume a steady state con-
dition. Equations (1) and (2) reduce, under these conditions, to
dL,
(3) Vi - = 0 diLIV, + ix
dt
(4) 0 Vir(c - c1) - d1LjVj + P1
It follows that:
1
(5) cj = c?+-- (PI - f)
girl
This equation, while admittedly being a rough approximation, allows us
to think about the significance of some of the terms more easily than if
we try to grapple with equations (1) and (2).
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First of all, note that Pi is usually negative, that is, P1 represents
an oxygen demand on the system, either from benthic demand or from
chemical oxygen demand. Let Pi represent oxygen demand, that is,
P,= - P1. Then
1
(6) c -,- c_ (P -+ f,)
Vir,
This simple equation asserts that the equilibrium concentration of DO
(ci) is linearly related to the total load on the section.
slope -
0 0 fl
It is clear that the assurance with which we can predict DO is directly
related to the confidence that can be placed in the values of ri, Pi and
f, (the value of V, is known quite accurately).
Consider equation (6). Under Plan II devised by the DECS, we
would like ci to be 4.0 ppm and c' is about 8 ppm. Evidently
I 'I (Pi +[ f0) - 8.0 - 4.0 == 4.0
Since the values of P1, fl, and ri are all open to much question, the prob-
lem we address here is how much of an error in the parameters would
make a significant difference in the results. Suppose V, and r, are
exactly as estimated, but the sum of P1 and f1 are 10% higher or 10%
lower than anticipated. In the former case c1 will be 3.6 ppm, in the
latter 4.4 ppm. Now suppose f1 and Pi are exactly as anticipated but
the value of ri is either 10% higher or 10% lower than anticipated. If
10% higher, the level of DO will be about 4.4 ppm, if 10% lower, the
level of DO will be about 3.6 ppm.
[Vo1.120:419
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From the arguments in the main text, it would be unusual if
the errors involved were of the order of a mere 10%. This simple
illustration, then, demonstrates the hazards of (a) not determining
both probable values of all parameters and probable values of their
errors, and (b) not running sensitivity analyses on the model, utilizing
the probability distribution data on the parameters, to determine what
level of certitude is being proffered to the decisionmaker by the model.
